Kendall Q. Northern v. N. Eldon Barnes, et al. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
Kendall Q. Northern v. N. Eldon Barnes, et al. : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale; Haley & Stolebarger; Pro Bono Attorney for Petitioner.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; James H. Beadles; Lorenzo K. Miller; Assistant Attorneys
General; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Northern v. Barnes, No. 920116.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4066
B H l t r 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
.A10 ^ZOW^O 
DOCKET NO.
 I N THE S D P R B M H > ^ « o O R T 0 F THE STATE OF DTAH 
voif^y 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, et al., 
Respondents. 
Case No. 920116 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
On a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-1555 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 575-1600 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 
F I L E D 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, et al., 
Respondents. 
Case No. 920116 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
On a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-1555 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 575-1600 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND OTHER RULES • . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 8 
Introduction 8 
POINT ONE: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF SINCE THE BOARD OF 
PARDONS HAD NOT VIOLATED RULE 310 . • . 12 
A. Although Rule 310 did require a 
hearing, it did not require the 
Board to hold a hearing before 
staying the 1981 parole order. 
Rule 310 permitted temporary 
rescission of Northern's May 10 
parole date, based on 
information received a few days 
earlier about his current risk 
to the community, ongoing drug 
abuse, and his lies about drug 
abuse at the time of the crime. . 13 
B. The Board had before it "new" 
evidence, within the meaning of 
that term in Rule 310, that 
release of Northern in May 1988 
would have presented a serious 
risk of danger to the community. . . . 15 
i 
POINT TWO: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE BOARD'S SUBSTANTIVE PAROLE 
DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN AN ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF 19 
A. Article VII, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution grants the 
Board of Pardons exclusive 
authority to make parole 
decisions 23 
B. The separation of powers 
provision in Article V of the 
Utah Constitution precludes the 
judiciary from exercising 
functions delegated to the 
executive branch, including 
parole decisions by the Board 
of Pardons 25 
ADDENDA 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES . . . ADDENDUM A 
Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992) . . ADDENDUM B 
ORDER OF PAROLE, DATED JULY 8, 1981 ADDENDUM C 
DUCHESNE COUNTY JAIL INMATE INFRACTION REPORT . . . ADDENDUM D 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, DATED MAY 5, 1988 . . . ADDENDUM E 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ADDENDUM F 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS . . ADDENDUM G 
ORDER OF PAROLE, DATED JULY 9, 1991 ADDENDUM H 
Preece v. House, No. 920726, Filed Feb. 17, 1993 . . ADDENDUM I 
NOTIFICATION OF BOARD DECISION, DATED MAY 9, 1988 . . ADDENDUM J 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, DATED JUNE 16, 1980 . . . ADDENDUM K 
90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION, DATED JULY 28, 1980 . . ADDENDUM L 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Cardisco v. Davis. 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 216 (1937) . . . 23, 24 
Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) . 7, 18, 20, 21 
Garrish v. Barnes. 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992) . . . . 2 
Greenholz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex. 442 U.S. 1 (1979) 24 
Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons. 806 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991) . . 2 
Kimball v. Grantsville City. 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 (1899) . . . 26 
Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1992) . . . 2 
Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992). 3, 12, 20, 21, 22 
Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1986) 26 
Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991) 12 
Preece v. House. No. 920726-CA (Utah App. Feb. 17, 1993) . 9, 10, 22 
Smith v. Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) 12 
State ex rel. Bishop v. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah 
478, 52 P. 1090 (1898) 23 
State v. Mondraaon. 107 N.M. 421, 759 P.2d 1003 (N.M. App. 
1988) 20 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) . . . 2, 16 
State v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1992) . . . . 16 
Stewart v. State. 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992) 2 
Termunde v. Cook, 786 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1990) 2 
Wright Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232 
(Utah 1980) 26 
iii 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. V 2 
Utah Const, art. V, § 12 (1896, amended 1992) 2 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1 (1896, amended 1984) 3 
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (1896, amended 1992) 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) (Supp. 1992) 3, 20 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1992) 1 
Utah Admin. Code R270-310 (Board of Pardons Policies and 
Procedures Manual Number 3.10) (1986) 3 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, et al., 
Respondents. 
: Case No. 920116 
: Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992), which grants the Utah Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals." Northern's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was granted 
on October 28, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the 
Board did not violate the law, i.e.f its own Rule 310, and that 
therefore Petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that a court 
cannot judicially review the Board of Pardons' substantive 
discretionary decision to rescind a parole date based on 
circumstances set forth in Rule 310? 
1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing a denial of a habeas corpus petition, the court 
examines the record "in the light most favorable to the findings 
and judgment . . . and will not reverse if there is a reasonable 
basis in the record to support the trial court's denial of the 
writ." Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991 
(citations omitted). A lower court's factual findings will be set 
aside only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). However, the lower court's "conclusions of 
law are accorded no deference but are reviewed for correctness." 
Termunde v. Cook, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) I citing Fernandez 
v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989)); see generally Stewart v. State, 
830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah App. 1992). 
Likewise, in reviewing by writ of certiorari a decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, this Court examines the legal conclusions of 
the intermediate appellate court for correctness. Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1992); Garrish v. Barnes, 
202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND OTHER RULES 
The following provisions are included in Addendum A to this 
brief. Other relevant pleadings and documents, including the 
judgment of the trial court and the opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals are also included in the Addenda. 
Utah Const, art. V, § 12 (1896, amended 1992) 
Utah Const, art. V. 
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Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1 (1896, amended 1984). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) (Supp. 1992). 
Utah Admin. Code R270-310 (Board of Pardons Policies and Procedures 
Manual Number 3.10) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a review on certiorari of a decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed the order of the district court denying 
Northern's petition for an extraordinary writ. Northern v. Barnes, 
825 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992). (Addendum B). 
On July 30, 1980, petitioner was convicted of criminal 
homicide-murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. Petitioner was 
sentenced to serve two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State 
Prison (R. at 90). After a hearing before the Board of Pardons on 
July 8, 1981, petitioner received a prospective parole date of May 
10, 1988 (R. at 90). (Order of Parole, Addendum C). 
Petitioner was transferred to the Duchesne County Jail in 
March 1986 (R. at 91). On February 25, 1988, jail authorities 
discovered petitioner using marijuana (R. at 91). (Violation Report 
of February 25, 1988, Addendum D). The incident was reported to 
officials at the Utah State Prison, and the Board of Pardons 
obtained the information sometime prior to May 10, 1988 (R. at 91). 
On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested that 
the Utah State Prison perform a psychological assessment on 
petitioner (R. at 91). The Board did not receive the results of 
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this psychological assessment until May 5, 1988, five days before 
Northern's proposed parole date (R. at 91). (Psychological 
Assessment of May 5, 1988, Addendum E). While the authors 
recommended that the report be regarded favorably, they also 
discussed Northern's drug problem in depth (R. at 92). More 
specifically, the report said that Northern viewed his drug 
dependency as a major factor in his anti-social behavior (R. at 
92). It also noted that Northern admitted being high on LSD at the 
time he committed his crimes and that he had used LSD, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and marijuana (R. at 91-92). This information was 
not available to the Board in 1981 (Finding of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal No. 10, Addendum F). 
The report indicated that Northern's major problem was his 
inability to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal 
substances (R. at 92). 
In light of the information it had, the Board of Pardons had 
concerns regarding petitioner's fitness for parole release. 
Therefore, on May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons rescinded 
Northern's parole release date of May 10, 1988 and continued the 
matter pending a second psychological evaluation and complete 
prison progress report (R. at 93). 
The second psychological report was prepared on May 11, 1990. 
It considered the issue of how Northern would react under stress in 
an unstructured setting. It considered how his relationship with 
his father might affect his success as he was planning to live with 
4 
his parents, at least for a short time, while on parole (R. at 94). 
The report recommended that petitioner be paroled to Arizona. (R. 
at 94). The report recommended that "due to his extensive drug 
history and continued problem with drugs, drug therapy on an 
outpatient basis should be required as well as therapy to assist 
him in adjusting to the social demands of a new lifestyle." 
On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for 
July 8, 1988, to review petitioner's status (R. at 94). Petitioner 
received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988 (R. at 94). 
At the July 8, 1988 hearing, petitioner was permitted to address 
the Board, present information, and respond to the Board's 
questions (R. at 94). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board 
of Pardons affirmed the rescission of petitioner's May 10, 1988 
parole release date, stating: "[T]he board is extremely concerned 
about first of all, the risk that you present to society from the 
overall record, from the nature of the crime, and specifically also 
including the information which the board has received since that 
time and in comparing it with the overall record." R. at 94. 
On October 9, 1988, Northern escaped from the Duchesne County 
Jail (R. at 94). As a result, the Board of Pardons rescinded the 
May 1990 scheduled rehearing (R. at 94-95). He was subsequently 
captured in Canada and returned to Utah on October 6, 1989 (R. at 
5). 
On March 30, 1990, Northern filed in Third District Court a 
document entitled Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
5 
and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or Declaratory Judgement, 
requesting the court to 1) declare the post-May 10, 1988 
confinement illegal; 2) order the Board to release Northern on 
parole to Arizona; and 3) award attorneys' fees, damages for 
contract breach, and other appropriate relief. (R. at 2) 
(Petition, Addendum G). Based on an evidentiary hearing and oral 
argument, the district court denied the petition for an 
extraordinary writ. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order of Dismissal, R. at 89, Addendum F). 
Northern appealed the denial of his petition to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which issued an opinion affirming the decision of the 
district court on January 24, 1992; (R. at 104) (Addendum B). 
While this case was being appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the Board paroled Northern to the State of Arizona. (1991 Order of 
Parole, Addendum H). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are set out in the 
Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Northern sought from the district court extraordinary relief 
in the nature of mandamus under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. To be entitled to extraordinary relief, he must show 
that the Board did not regularly pursue its authority, which is 
limited by the statutes and rules pertinent to the Board when the 
6 
harm occurred, specifically Rule 310 of the Board's Policies and 
Procedures. 
Northern is not entitled to extraordinary relief because the 
Board did comply with the law. Contrary to Northern's arguments, 
Rule 310 did not require a pre-rescission hearing. Indeed, Rule 
310 allowed the Board to temporarily rescind a parole date solely 
on the basis of information that there was new evidence that, if 
released, Northern would present a serious risk or danger to the 
community. When the Board temporarily rescinded the parole release 
date, it had information in the form of a psychological report and 
a report of recent drug use in a county jail indicating that 
Northern had previously lied to the-Board about his serious and 
ongoing abuse of drugs, and, more importantly, was still willing to 
violate the law in order to abuse drugs. 
In its opinion affirming the district court's denial of the 
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly decided that the Board's 
subjective and substantive decision pertaining to an individual's 
fitness for parole was not subject to judicial review. This 
decision is not in conflict with Foote v. Board of Pardons, 809 
P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), which dealt with the Court's authority to 
review alleged procedural violations by the Board, not the Board's 
substantive parole decisions. The appellate court's conclusion 
that the Board's exercise of its discretionary authority is not 
subject to judicial review is required not only by Utah statute but 
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also by the Utah Constitution, which expressly delegates the parole 
power to the Board of Pardons. 
A court, considering a petition for extraordinary writ, may 
not substitute its judgment of a person's risk or dangerousness for 
the Board's judgment. A court that did so would improperly 
exercise an executive function and violate the separation of powers 
provision of the Utah Constitution. The appellate court properly 
avoided this constitutional conflict and interpreted Foote to 
extend judicial review via Rule 65B to alleged procedural 
violations only. Because the Board did not violate its procedures 
when it rescinded Northern's parole date, Northern is not entitled 
to extraordinary relief and the Court of Appeals' decision should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In his original petition for extraordinary relief, Northern 
asserted two causes of action: 1) the Board violated its own 
policies and procedures when it rescinded his parole date in 1988; 
and 2) the Board's 1988 rescission of Northern's parole date 
breached his 1981 parole "contract- .* Complaint and Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or 
Northern does not challenge on certiorari the Court of 
Appeals' legal ruling that a Rule 65B action is not an appropriate 
vehicle for litigating claims for breach of contract. 
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Declaratory Judgement, Case No. 90090125, Third District Court, 
filed March 30, 1990 (Petition, Addendum G). 
Northern's first cause of action essentially is a request for 
relief under the mandamus provision of Rule 65B — a complaint that 
the respondent has failed to act in accordance with law, thereby 
harming him. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (1992).2 Where the 
extraordinary relief requested is in the nature of mandamus, a 
court is limited to determining whether the respondent has 
"regularly pursued its authority," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)(4), which 
is defined by the statutes and by agency rules in place when the 
alleged harm occurred. See Preece v. House, No. 920726-CA (Utah 
App. Feb. 17, 1993) (appropriate extraordinary relief under Rule 
65B(e) for Board of Pardons' failure to follow its own procedural 
rule is to order Board to comply with its rule) (Addendum I). 
In Preece, the Court of Appeals reviewed an order of the Third 
District Court which granted a petition for habeas corpus and 
ordered a prisoner's release. At issue in the petition was the 
Board's alleged failure to comply with its own rules, specifically 
its responsibility to provide a written explanation for a denial of 
parole. The Court of Appeals found that the district court 
2
 Rule 65B was substantially reorganized in 1991 although the 
language pertaining to mandamus was only technically amended. In 
1990, when this petition was filed, the then existing mandamus 
provision was codified at Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) through (4), 
and (e). Because of the substantive similarities between the 1990 
version of the rule and the current version as it pertains to 
mandamus, Respondents will cite to the current version in this 
brief. 
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exceeded its authority by ordering the Petitioner's release as a 
remedy for the Board's failure to comply with its procedural rules. 
Preece, slip op. at 2 (Addendum I). The appellate court remanded 
the case to the district court with instructions to treat the 
petition under Rule 65B(e) and to order the Board to comply with 
its rules and "expeditiously . • . provide the district court and 
petitioner with a written explanation of its reasons for the parole 
decision." Id. 
In the district court, Petitioner Northern made a challenge 
very similar to that in Preece. He claimed that the Board violated 
its own rule governing rescission of a set parole date, namely Rule 
310, in two ways: (1) by failing to hold a hearing before acting 
on May 9, 1988, to stay the release on parole on May 10, 1988, 
pending further investigation; and (2) by rescinding his parole 
date based on information that purportedly did not constitute "new 
evidence" under Rule 310. He also vaguely asserted that these 
violations of Rule 310 denied him his constitutional rights. 
In oral argument before the district court, Northern's counsel 
described the issues presented by his claims as follows: 
It seems to me, Your Honor, that there are really three 
critical issues, perhaps, I think the court may need to 
decide in order to fairly adjudicate this matter. One of 
them is simply did the Board of Pardons follow its own 
policies and procedures under Rule 3.10 which we have 
discussed previously at length with you . . . . I think 
the next issue the court would look at is was it exempted 
from following 3.10 by this introductory language of 655-
101 . . . . I think the final issue would be if the Board 
violated 3.10, and is not saved under section 655-101, 
what is the appropriate remedy? 
10 
(Tr. of Hearing before Judge Timothy Hanson, July 27, 1990, at 34, 
35, R. at 102). Faced with these issues and arguments, Judge 
Hanson concluded that Rule 310's requirements for a hearing were 
not violated. He found that there was adequate information before 
the Board on May 9 when it blocked the May 10 release on parole: 
first, Northern had throughout his seven-year incarceration— 
indeed, until his psychological evaluation on May 5, 1988—lied 
about his serious drug abuse before, during, and after commission 
of the murder; second, there was evidence of ongoing drug use and 
violation of drug laws and prison rules as late as February 1988. 
Judge Hanson concluded that this information constituted "new 
evidence" not available to the Board in July 1981. Since no 
violation of Rule 310 had occurred, the trial court rejected the 
secondary claim that violation of Rule 310 had also denied him 
constitutional rights. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Addendum F). 
Northern's brief to the Utah Court of Appeals framed the issue 
in this two-part manners "Did the Board of Pardons violate its own 
procedural and substantive rules as set forth in Board of Pardons 
Rule 3.10 ["Rule 3.10"], thereby denying Northern due process of 
law?" Brief of Petitioner at 1, Northern v. Barnes, No. 900566-CA. 
In affirming Judge Hanson's denial of extraordinary relief, the 
Court of Appeals did not expressly decide whether any violation of 
Rule 310 occurred. Instead, the court held that any procedural 
deficiencies were cured by the hearing held in July 1988, before 
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Northern's petition for extraordinary relief was filed• Northern 
v, Barnes, 825 P.2d at 699, 
The Court of Appeals saw that other arguments on appeal 
challenged the substance of the Board's decision to rescind the 
parole based on the new evidence before it. But the court rejected 
this "suggestion" that courts may second-guess the Board of Pardons 
and essentially reweigh the evidence before the Board and determine 
anew whether an inmate's parole date should be rescinded. It is 
this latter ruling that Northern challenges on certiorari.3 
Before this Court, Northern claims once again that the 
conditions in Board Rule 310 for rescinding the May 10, 1988 parole 
date were not satisfied either on May 9 or after the July 1988 
hearing. In addition, he claims that Rule 310 required the Board 
to hold a rescission hearing before it acted on May 9. These 
questions are addressed in Point I, below. 
Secondly, Northern asserts that the Court of Appeals 
erroneously declined to evaluate the "reasonableness" of the 
Board's rescission of his parole based on that evidence. This 
issue is addressed in Point II, below. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY 
3For the first time in his Brief on Certiorari, Northern 
suggests at page 30 that Rule 310, even if the Board complied with 
its requirements, violates due process. This issue was not raised 
in either the district court or the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 
it should not be addressed by this Court. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 
P.2d 467, 470 n.4, (Utah 1992); Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991). 
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RELIEF SINCE THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAD NOT 
VIOLATED RULE 310. 
A. Although Rule 310 did require a 
hearing, it did not require the 
Board to hold a hearing before 
staying the 1981 parole order. Rule 
310 permitted temporary rescission 
of Northern's May 10 parole date, 
based on information received a few 
days earlier about his current risk 
to the community, ongoing drug 
abuse, and his lies about drug abuse 
at the time of the crime. 
Northern asserts that Rule 310 required the Board to hold a 
hearing before it acted on May 9 to rescind the May 10, 1988 parole 
date set in 1981. This Court should reject this contention based 
on the plain language of the rule itself. 
Rule 310, which in 1988 governed the Board's rescission of a 
parole release date, provided: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the 
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect except upon 
written referral indicating that the offender is in 
violation of the rules and regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any 
local, state, or federal government, or new evidence is 
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a 
serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing 
date, information shall be provided to the Board 
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon 
receipt of such information, the offender will be 
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be 
notified of all allegations and the date of the scheduled 
hearing at least seven days in advance. 
13 
(Addendum A). Under the clear mandate of this rule, the 1981 order 
setting Northern's parole release date of May 10, 1988 was to 
remain in effect unless the Board received either: (a) a written 
referral about his violation of law or prison rule; or (b) new 
evidence that his release would present a serious risk or danger to 
the community. 
In this case, the Board received information shortly before 
May 10 that satisfied both prongs of this part of the rule. The 
Board had received a referral from the Duchesne County Jail 
(Addendum D) stating that Northern had been found using drugs, a 
violation of prison rules and state law, in February 1988, only 
three months before his scheduled parole release date. The Board 
also received the May 5, 1988 psychological evaluation (Addendum 
E), in which the Board learned that Northern had since 1980 lied 
about his lack of drug use and abuse. The Board learned for the 
first time that Northern had been a serious drug abuser (of LSD, 
cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana) since the age of 16 and that 
he was, in fact, high on LSD at the time of his crime. 
Given this information, on May 9, 1988 the Board acted in 
accordance with the rule by temporarily rescinding the May 10, 1988 
release date. At the same time, the Board requested an additional 
psychological evaluation to answer questions raised by the May 5, 
1988 evaluation. (Notification of Parole Decision, dated May 9, 
1988, Addendum J) (R. at 10). The Board then scheduled a hearing 
for July 8, 1988 at which Northern would have the opportunity to 
14 
respond.4 Even Northern admits that at this hearing, he was 
permitted to address the Board of Pardons, present information, and 
respond to questioning from the Board.5 Brief of Petitioner at 12. 
Rule 310 does not require a hearing before an order setting a 
release date is temporarily rescinded. Petitioner's tortured 
construction of the rule would prevent the Board from protecting 
the public in those instances when a soon-to-be paroled inmate 
engages in unlawful activity or is found to be dangerous shortly 
before the original parole release date. As a matter of public 
policy, this Court should reject his distortion of the plain 
meaning of the rule. 
B. The Board had before it "new" evidence, 
within the meaning of that term in Rule 
310, that release of Northern in May 1988 
would have presented a serious risk of 
danger to the community. 
A
 Had the Board reversed its rescission at this hearing, 
instead of affirming it, Petitioner still would have had a remedy. 
The Board could have granted him credit for the time he had served 
in prison since May 10, 1988. 
5
 Under the rules, a rescission hearing is classified as a 
"full hearing" at which the inmate is guaranteed a personal 
appearance "in which all the facts of the case are reviewed, 
evidence is presented and statements are taken from involved 
parties." Utah Admin. Code R270-306-2 (1987-88). As Petitioner 
admitted, he received these rights at the July hearing. Just 
because the July 8 hearing was labelled a "special appearance" 
rather than "rescission" hearing does not constitute a violation of 
the rule. Both rescission and special appearance hearings are 
"full hearings" under Rule 306 and the same opportunities of 
notice, personal appearance, and ability to present evidence are 
guaranteed. Additionally, Petitioner has not alleged that he was 
misled or confused by the designation "special appearance." He 
knew the Board was going to discuss the rescission. 
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In his Findings of Fact, Judge Hanson found that the use of 
marijuana at the Duchesne County Jail in February 1988 and 
information contained in a psychological evaluation dated May 5, 
1988 was "new information in that it was not available to the Board 
of Pardons on July 8, 1981." Findings of Fact 6, 10 (R. at 90, 92) 
(Addendum F). Under the standard of review adopted by this Court, 
factual findings will be set aside only if they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991)). 
Petitioner does not contend that these factual findings are 
clearly erroneous but he (a) protests their designation as "new 
evidence;" and (b) states that they are not the "best" evidence of 
his dangerousness or risk to society. 
The district court defined "new evidence" as information 
arising between the time the Board initially set the release date, 
in this case July 1981, and the scheduled release date. This is 
the obvious meaning of the term in the context of Rule 310. The 
Board should not be bound by facts frozen in time. In order to 
fulfill its constitutional and statutory responsibilities and 
determine if an inmate is ready for release, the Board must be able 
to consider all conduct indicative of a person's dangerousness that 
occurs, or becomes known, since the Board's initial setting of a 
release date. This essential flexibility is provided by Judge 
Hanson's commonsense interpretation of Rule 310. 
16 
In his brief before this Court, Northern seems to agree that 
this is the appropriate definition of "new evidence." He states 
that the "plain and literal meaning of the term 'new evidence' [in 
Rule 310] is evidence which was previously concealed from the Board 
of Pardons or specific, affirmative acts that occurred or became 
known subsequent to an inmate's last review or consideration by the 
Board of Pardons." Brief of Petitioner at 29. 
In the psychological evaluation, which was received on May 5, 
1988, only five days before the scheduled release date, the Board 
learned that Northern had previously concealed and lied about his 
drug history. The evidence available to the Board in 1981 
overwhelmingly indicated that Petitioner had no drug problem and 
that drugs were not involved in the crime. In the June 13, 1980 
report that was before the Board in 1981 when the May 10, 1988 
release date was originally set, the diagnostic agent stated: "Mr. 
Northern reports only one prior arrest as a juvenile and no history 
whatsoever of drug or alcohol abuse. There is no available 
information to suggest that either alcohol or drugs played a part 
in the current crime . . . ." (June 1980 Diagnostic Report, 
Addendum K) (emphasis added). In a 90-day diagnostic report 
prepared two weeks later, the investigator likewise reported that 
Northern had no significant drug use problem. (July 28, 1980 90-
day Diagnostic Report, Addendum L). The 1988 psychological report, 
in startling language, made it clear to the Board that Northern 
had, in fact been deeply involved in drug abuse. 
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At 16 Mr. Northern left home to wander the western states 
and became more deeply involved with drugs and people 
using drugs. He stated that he was high on LSD at the 
time he commited [sic] his crime. Among drugs that Mr. 
Northern admitted to using were LSD, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other drugs 
such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory. 
(Addendum E). 
This information of concealment of his drug abuse was 
indisputably "new evidence," under either Northern's formulation or 
under the more simple definition used by Judge Hanson. Thus, the 
Board complied with Rule 310. 
The report of Northern's February 1988 use of marijuana at the 
Duchesne County Jail constituted additional "new evidence" under 
both Judge Hanson's definition and Northern's own formulation as a 
"specific or affirmative [act] that occurred . . . subsequent to 
[Northern's] last review." 
Significantly, besides constituting new evidence, this 
information of drug use in February 1988 also separately satisfied 
the alternative basis in Rule 310 permitting rescission of a 
release date based on a "written referral" indicating a violation 
of law or prison rules. This information alone gave the Board a 
lawful reason to temporarily rescind the parole date of May 10, 
1988. Thus, the Board's actions on May 9 did not violate Rule 310. 
At page 29 of his brief to this Court, Northern argues that, 
even if this evidence is new it is not "the best evidence" of 
Northern's threat to the community. In essence, as the Court of 
Appeals recognized, this is actually an argument, premised on Foote 
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v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), that a court can 
substitute its judgment about whether to parole an inmate for the 
Board's judgment. As discussed below under Point II, Foote does 
not sanction such second-guessing of the Board's substantive 
decisions about parole, which is, in any event, barred by the state 
constitution and statute. 
The actions of the Board in rescinding Northern's parole date 
comported not only with the procedural requirements of Rule 310 but 
with notions of coramon sense. The Board is charged by law not just 
with the obligation to determine an individual's fitness for parole 
but also with the duty to protect the public. In May 1988, the 
Board came upon new evidence that Northern had previously withheld 
information from the Board and that he had recently violated the 
law. Using its experience and expertise, the Board decided that 
this new evidence indicated that Northern would present a serious 
risk or danger to the community if he were released on May 10, 
1988. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE BOARD'S SUBSTANTIVE PAROLE 
DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN AN ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF. 
In addition to his claim that Rule 310 was violated by the 
Board in his case, Northern contends that, even if Rule 310's 
requirements were satisfied, a court can reweigh the evidence and 
redetermine whether it warranted rescission of his May 10, 1988 
parole date. Brief of Petitioner at 29-30. Northern asserts that 
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this Court's decision in Foote subjects this discretionary decision 
of the Board to such judicial review. Jto. at 21. 
This is the same argument he made unsuccessfully to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. That court disagreed with Northern's 
interpretation of Foote, stating that Foote dealt solely with 
procedural due process issues. Northern. 825 P.2d at 699. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-
5(3) (Supp. 1992) to prohibit judicial review of the Board's 
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine whether or not 
an inmate should be released to the community. See Northern, 825 
P.2d at 699; see also Foote, 808 P.2d at 735 (the number of years 
a defendant will spend in prison is left to the "unfettered 
discretion of the board of pardons"); State v. Mondracron, 107 N.M. 
421, 759 P.2d 1003, 1004 (N.M. App. 1988) ("While there may be 
regulations on the manner of the exercise of the power, the 
ultimate right to pardon is unrestrained by any consideration other 
than the conscience, wisdom, and sense of public duty of the 
governor."). 
Foote was brought as an original Petition for a Writ granting 
Extraordinary Relief directly in this Court, challenging the 
procedures used by the Board of Pardons. Foote, an inmate, 
contended "that the manner in which his parole hearings [had] been 
conducted [had] deprived him of procedural due process." Foote, 
808 P.2d at 734. Because the facts relating to the conduct of 
parole hearings were undocumented, this Court remanded the case to 
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the district court to flush out the "facts concerning the 
procedures followed by the board," .Id. at 735 (emphasis added), 
and to obtain a ruling on what is procedurally required.6 Because 
the Utah Constitution guarantees inmates due process protection 
during original parole grant hearings before the Board, this Court 
declared that habeas corpus review of the Board's actions in 
conducting those hearings is available via an extraordinary writ, 
notwithstanding the fact that section 77-27-5(3) bars a direct 
appeal from the substantive parole decisions of the Board. Id. 
In the instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that 
Northern's substantive claims went not to the "procedural due 
process issues outlined in Foote, but to the reasonableness of the 
Board's decision . . . ." Northern, 825 P.2d at 699. Thus, the 
Northern court found that the language in Foote, stating that 
habeas corpus review of Board actions was available to challenge 
the manner in which parole hearings were conducted, did not apply 
to Northern insofar as he was not challenging the manner in which 
the rescission hearing was held, but the result that was reached. 
This is a correct interpretation of Foote, not just because 
the Foote Court spoke in terms of procedural due process, but, more 
fundamentally, because limiting the appropriate scope of judicial 
review of Board actions to allegations of procedural violations, 
6The issue of what procedural protection is required by the 
Utah Constitution at parole grant hearings is currently before this 
Court in Labrum v. Board of Pardons, No. 920022. 
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rather than substantive decisions, is mandated by the state 
constitution and statute. 
In perhaps the central, and most controversial, paragraph of 
the opinion, the Court of Appeals stated in Northern that state law 
barred judicial review of the Board's subjective and substantive 
decisions. 
The Board's right to rely on any factors known in 
May 1988, or later adduced at the July 1988 hearing, and 
the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding 
whether Northern posed a societal risk, as well as 
whether an order of restitution was appropriate, are all 
matters within the discretion of the Board. They are 
precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to 
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3). Accordingly we 
hold that habeas corpus is not available in this case as 
a post release remedy to modify the release date ordered 
by the Board. 
Northern, 825 P.2d at 699; accord Preece v. House, No. 920726-CA, 
(Utah App. Feb. 17, 1993) (Appendix I). The Court tied this 
statement to section 77-27-5(3), which states that decisions of the 
Board of Pardons are final and are not subject to judicial review. 
However, the unreviewability of the Board's substantive parole 
decisions is not just a creature of the legislature. It is instead 
mandated by the interplay of two separate provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. Article VII, section 12 specifically creates a Board 
of Pardons and Parole to make these substantive decisions about 
parole. Article V explicitly divides the powers of the government 
into three distinct departments and prohibits one of those 
departments from exercising functions appertaining to another. 
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A- Article VII
 # section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution grants the Board of Pardons 
exclusive authority to make parole 
decisions• 
The Board of Pardons and Parole was initially created as a 
Board of Pardons, composed of the Governor, the Attorney General, 
and the Justices of the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Const, art. VII, 
S 12 (1896, amended 1992). This entity had the sole authority to 
remit fines, commute punishments, and grant pardons after 
convictions. Jxi. An early Utah Supreme Court case held the Board 
of Pardons had exclusive authority to grant paroles, the legal 
equivalent to a commutation. State ex rel. Bishop v. State Board 
of Corrections, 16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898); accord Cardisco v. 
Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 216, 218 (1937). 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop, the parole 
system has been administered by the Board of Pardons. In many 
states and in the federal government, the power of executive 
clemency is administered by the chief of the executive branch, that 
is, by the governor or the president, and the parole system is 
administered by a separate, legislatively created entity. As the 
very term suggests, executive clemency, which includes pardons, 
commutations7, and remissions is inherently an executive function. 
The constitutional grant of exclusive authority to the Board 
to decide when and if an inmate is ready to return to the community 
7
 As previously stated, parole also is a part of executive 
clemency, being in legal effect a commutation. Bishop, 57 P. at 
1090. 
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before the end of his sentence makes good sense in light of the 
^discretionary, predictive nature of that decision. From a policy 
perspective, an executive body, rather than the judiciary, is 
better able to make this determination. As stated by Justice 
Polland in Cardisco, the Board "has better facilities and better 
opportunity than the trial court to learn about the offender, and 
as to his character, experience, training, the past criminal 
record, if any, former associations, family connections, condition 
of his health, etc." Cardisco, 64 P.2d at 222 (Folland, J., 
concurring). 
The Court of Appeal's holding in the instant case is in accord 
with the constitutional delegation of authority, prior Utah 
decisions, and the historical purposes and functions of the Board 
of Pardons. As the Board was better able to look at a person's 
character and reformation than a trial court in 1937 when Cardisco 
was determined, so the Board is still better able today to make 
that determination. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed 
out, the parole-release decision is not a factual determination 
like those made by courts. 
The parole-release decision, however, is more 
subtle and depends on an amalgam of elements, some 
of which are factual but many of which are purely 
subjective appraisals by the Board members based 
upon their experience with the difficult and 
sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of 
parole release . . . . 
Greenholz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Kadish, The Advocate and the Exoert-
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-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 
813 (1961)). Finallyf because the Board administers the entire 
parole system, thus specializing in prisoner rehabilitation issues, 
it is better able than a court in an isolated case to develop the 
necessary expertise and to make parole decisions for all inmates 
that are consistent with each other. 
In sum, the people of this state have given the Board of 
Pardons the constitutional authority to determine whether an inmate 
has been rehabilitated sufficiently to return to the community 
without presenting a serious risk or danger. In rescinding 
Northern's parole date based on new evidence and evidence of his 
recent violation of drug laws, the Board exercised this authority. 
B. The separation of powers provision in article V of 
the Utah Constitution precludes the judiciary from 
exercising functions delegated to the executive 
branch, including parole decisions by the Board of 
Pardons. 
In light of the Board's exclusive constitutional authority to 
make parole decisions, a court's reweighing of the evidence would 
violate the separation of powers provision of the Utah 
Constitution. The article VII, section 12 power to grant parole is 
meaningless if it is just the ministerial power to sign the release 
order. The Board's authority, to be meaningful, must also embrace 
the power to determine what factors are relevant in the parole 
release decision, their relative importance in each case, and what 
weight to give each item of evidence. If the judiciary takes that 
power on itself, it would effectively be making the parole decision 
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delegated to the Board of Pardonsf an agency of the executive 
branch. See Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 
(1899) (delegation of power to one branch implies inhibition 
against its exercise by another branch). 
As noted under Point I, the Board of Pardons does not claim to 
be above the law. The Board recognizes that this Court can 
constitutionally compel it to follow the law by issuing an 
extraordinary writ. However, the state constitution and section 
77-27-5(3) preclude judicial review of the substantive decisions of 
the Board concerning parole, even if that review is sought by way 
of a Rule 65B(e) petition. As the Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded here, a court faced with such a petition for 
extraordinary relief is limited to determining whether the Board 
"has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) 
(1992). The purpose of mandamus is not to interfere with the 
"functions or the policies of other departments of government," or 
allow a court to substitute its judgment for that of an agency by 
telling the agency how to decide. Wright Development, Inc. v. City 
of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, at 233 (Utah 1980); See also Olson v. 
Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request 
that this Court affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^i^ day of March 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
fames H. Beadles Jc 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Sec, 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole - Appointment - Powers and 
procedures - Governor's powers and duties - Legislature's powers.] 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The 
Governor shall appoint the members of the board with the consent of 
the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided by statute. 
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and 
upon other conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole, 
remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute 
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases 
except treason and impeachments, subject to regulations as provided 
by statute. 
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be 
remitted and a commutation, parole, or pardon may not be granted 
except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and 
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been 
given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons 
therefor in each case, and the dissent of any member who may 
disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with 
all papers used upon the hearing. 
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all 
cases of convictions for offenses against the state except treason 
or conviction on impeachment. These respites or reprieves may not 
extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the 
board shall continue or determine the respite or reprieve, commute 
the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided in this section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may 
suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the 
Legislature at its next annual general session, when the 
Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its 
execution. If the Legislature takes no action on the case before 
adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, 
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Section 1. [Judicial powers - Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and 
such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. 
Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter 
and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences 
in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities 
which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, 
and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise 
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution 
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, 
or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct 
hearings. The chairperson shall appoint members to the panels in 
any combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by the 
board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The 
chairperson may participate on any panel and when doing so is 
chairperson of the panel. The chairperson of the board may 
designate the chairperson for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or 
restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or 
sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board 
or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken 
under this subsection other than by a majority of the board shall 
be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full 
hearing before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, 
rehearings, and parole revocation hearings, timely prior notice of 
the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the defendant, 
the county attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the 
case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials responsible 
for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, 
the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family 
shall include information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any 
related rules made by the board under that section. This 
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for the 
lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, 
restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are 
not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents 
the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or 
limitation of the governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in 
all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except 
treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or 
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of 
Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate 
the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for 
treason, the governor may suspend execution of the sentence until 
the case is reported to the Legislature at its next session. The 
Legislature shall then either pardon or commute the sentence, or 
direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions 
offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have 
restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted, 
or their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons 
shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to 
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards 
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, 
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or 
termination of sentence. 
Utah Admin. Code R270-310 (Board of Pardons Policies and Procedures 
Manual Number 3.10) (1986) 
To establish a process for the taking of a 
release or rehearing date once it has been 
set, and to allow for the designation of a 
hearing officer to hear such cases. 
The release or rehearing date established by 
the Board of Pardons shall remain in effect 
except upon written referral indicating that 
the offender is in violation of the rules and 
regulations of the Utah State Prison, 
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any 
local, state, or federal government, or new 
evidence is presented that an inmate, if 
released, would present a serious risk or 
danger to the community. 
Procedure: Prior to the rescinding of a parole or 
rehearing date, information shall be provided 
to the Board establishing the basis for the 
rescission hearing. Upon receipt of such 
information, the offender will be scheduled 
fora rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will 
be notified of all allegations and the date of 
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in 
advance. 
In the event of an escape, the Board will 
rescind the inmate's date upon official 
notification of escape from custody and 
continue the hearing until the inmate is 
available for appearance. 
A Board of Pardons hearing officer shall hear 
all matters when the violation consists of a 
new complaint or conviction for a non-violent 
felony, misdemeanor, or an adjudicated 
violation of rules or regulations. All 
felonies involving crimes against persons or 
other violent felonies shall be heard by the 
Board. 
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing 
and make an interim decision to be reviewed, 
along with a summary report of the hearing, by 
the Board members. Any decision by a hearing 
officer shall be binding and in full force and 
effect until reviewed by Board members, who 
Purpose: 
Policy: 
will make the final decision by approving, 
modifying, or overturning a hearing officer's 
decision. The decision is then entered into 
the record at a regular scheduled Board 
meeting and the offender is then informed by 
mail of the results. He is not afforded a 
personal appearance for this review. 
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Kendall Q. NORTHERN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
N. Eldon BARNES, Warden, Utah State 
Prison and the Department of Correc-
tions through the Board of Pardons, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 900566-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 24, 1992. 
Inmate petitioned for habeas corpus 
after his original parole date was rescind-
ed. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied the 
petition, and inmate appealed. While ap-
peal was pending, inmate was paroled. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, PJ., held 
that: (1) inmate's request for declaratory 
relief was not moot following his release on 
parole, and (2) decision of Board of Pardons 
to not give inmate earlier release was an 
exercise of its discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Billings, J., concurred in the result 
See also 814 P.2d 1148. 
1. Courts <*=>207.1 
In general, purpose of extraordinary 
relief under extraordinary writs rule is to 
test lawfulness of imprisonment, and pro-
priety of any related proceedings, by forc-
ing judicial hearing. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
65B. 
2. Courts *=>207.1 
Extraordinary writs rule does not pro-
vide procedure to bring contract claims. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 66B. 
3. Habeas Corpus «=>826(2) 
Inmate's demand for immediate parole 
was moot where parole was granted subse-
quent to filing of appeal from denial of 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 65B. 
4. Declaratory Judgment e»84 
A parolee's request for declaratory re-
lief as to unlawfulness of his confinement 
was not rendered moot by fact that parole 
was granted subsequent to filing of appeal; 
parolee was alleging that if Board of Par-
dons had not violated his due process 
rights in rescinding his original parole date 
he would have completed his parole, and 
parolee was claiming credit against his pa-
role period for time served while incarcer-
ated after his original parole date. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
5. Criminal Law *=>1216.1(2) 
Discretion to give credit for time 
served lies solely with the Board of Par-
dons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). 
6. Prisons *»15(1) 
Power to reduce or terminate sen-
tences is vested exclusively within Board of 
Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). 
7. Pardon and Parole G»59 
Any of alleged procedural deficiencies 
in rescinding inmate's original parole date 
were remedied by full rescission hearing 
held before Board of Pardons. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
8. Habeas Corpus *=>516 
Habeas corpus was not available as 
postrelease remedy to modify release date 
ordered by the Board of Pardons, even 
though parolee's original scheduled parole 
date was rescinded by Board of Pardons 
one day before parole date; Board had 
right to rely on any factors known at the 
time, including parolee's drug history, or 
later adduced at hearing ordered and had 
discretion to determine weight to be given 
to the factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1), 
(3Xc), (5), 77-27-5(3). 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and 
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellees. 
Before BENCH, PJ., and BILLINGS and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully peti-
tioned the trial court for a writ of habeas 
corpus following a decision of the Board of 
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original 
parole date. Northern appealed the trial 
court's decision, but was subsequently pa-
roled during the pendency of this appeal. 
We affirm. 
PACTS 
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old 
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder and aggravated robbery for his 
participation in the shooting death of a cab 
driver earlier that same year. Northern 
was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences 
at the Utah State Prison. He later admit-
ted he was under the influence of LSD at 
the time of the shooting, and had been 
deeply involved in drugs. 
After Northern had been imprisoned for 
a year, the Board met and granted him a 
May 10, 1988 parole date. The Board re-
considered Northern's status in 1984, and 
determined that the 1988 parole date would 
remain intact despite evidence that North-
ern had used drugs at the prison during his 
incarceration. 
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the 
Duchesne County Jail where he attained 
trustee status. Over the next two years, 
Northern was allowed to work unsuper-
vised outside the jail. In early 1988, with 
only a few months remaining before his 
projected parole, jail authorities discovered 
that Northern was again using drugs. 
This information was reported to the prison 
and received by the Board pefore his parole 
date. 
Two months before his parole date, a 
psychological assessment of Northern was 
made at the request of the Board. The 
report indicated that Northern had been a 
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as 
policy, that "[a]n offender shall be notified at 
least seven calendar days in advance of a hear-
ing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and 
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of 
the hearing." See Utah Admin.R. 655-202 
(1991). 
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heavy drug user, and had been unable to 
deal with life's stresses without drugs. 
The report also said Northern acknowl-
edged that his drug dependence was a ma-
jor factor contributing to his antisocial be-
havior. Before the report was published, 
the Board also attempted to obtain North-
ern's consent to additional terms of release 
that would have included drug testing. On 
the advice of his father, however, Northern 
refused to consent to the new conditions. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded 
Northern's May 10 parole date, pending 
further review, and ordered another psy-
chological evaluation. The need for anoth-
er psychological evaluation and complete 
prison progress report was listed in the 
written notice by the Board as the ground 
for rescinding Northern's original parole 
date. The supplemental assessment fo-
cused on potential problems affecting 
Northern's adjustment into society posed 
by his relationship with his father. A full 
rescission hearing was then scheduled for 
July 8, 1988.1 
At that hearing, the Board determined 
that Northern continued to be a risk to 
society, and refused to grant him parole at 
that time. The Board scheduled a rehear-
ing for May 1990, and Northern was re-
turned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two 
months later, however, he escaped and fled 
to Canada. The Board then rescinded the 
rehearing scheduled for May 1990. North-
ern was captured and returned to prison on 
October 6, 1989. 
Northern petitioned for extraordinary re-
lief and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(bX2) 
and <4), and (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.2 The petition prayed for (1) 
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of 
Northern's confinement since May 10, 
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate re-
lease, and (3) damages in excess of $10,000 
for "breach of contract" on the ground that 
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after 
Northern's petition was filed. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
65B (amended effective September 1, 1991) and 
advisory committee note. 
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a parole date created a legally binding 
agreement on the State. After a hearing, 
the trial court denied the petition, and 
Northern filed a notice of appeal. The 
Board subsequently set a July 1991 parole 
date, and required restitution of $26,350 by 
Northern as a condition of parole. North-
ern agreed to the new conditions, and was 
paroled on July 9, 1991, while this appeal 
was pending. 
ANALYSIS 
[1-3] In general, the purpose of ex-
traordinary relief under Rule 65B is to test 
the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the 
propriety of any related proceedings, by 
forcing a judicial hearing. See Ziegler v. 
Miliken, 583 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). 
Northern presents no authority, however, 
for extending the purposes of extraordi-
nary writs as a procedure to bring contract 
claims. We also conclude that the demand 
for Northern's immediate parole is moot 
because parole was granted subsequent to 
the filing of this appeal. Spain v. Stewart, 
639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).8 We are 
therefore left only with Northern's prayer 
for declaratory relief as to the unlawful-
ness of his "confinement" 
[4] Inasmuch as Northern is no longer 
incarcerated, we must consider whether his 
request for declaratory relief is also moot 
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus peti-
tions that would have been otherwise ren-
dered moot by the release of a prisoner 
when the prisoner suffers "collateral legal 
consequences" from a conviction, such as 
"the use of the conviction to impeach the 
petitioner's character or as a factor in de-
termining a sentence in a future trial, as 
well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage 
in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." 
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1981). 
Northern argues that he would have 
completed his parole in May 1991, if the 
Board had not violated his due process 
3. Although moot questions are generally not 
considered on appeal due to the judicial policy 
against advisory opinions, courts have reached 
the merits of an issue that is technically moot, 
but is "of wide concern, affects the public inter-
rights in rescinding his original parole date. 
Thus, the request for declaratory relief be-
comes a question of whether Northern's 
extended parole status was a collateral le-
gal consequence of alleged due process vio-
lations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct 373, 377, 9 L.Ed.2d 
285 (1963), the United States Supreme 
Court held that release on parole does not 
render a petition for habeas corpus moot 
because parole "imposes conditions which 
significantly confine and restrain [a parol-
ee's] freedom." Since parole imposes con-
ditions of confinement and Northern's pa-
role status past May 1991 is a consequence 
of rescinding his original parole date, we 
proceed to address his claim for credit 
against his parole period for time served 
while incarcerated after his original parole 
date. 
[5,6] In prior cases, discretion to give 
credit for time served was determined to lie 
solely with the Board. In State v. Schreu-
der, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the 
reason given for rejecting a similar argu-
ment demanding credit for time served was 
the Board's discretion to determine the pe-
riod of time to be served. Likewise, in 
State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09 
(Utah App.1988), we held that Utah courts 
have no authority to grant credit for time 
served prior to conviction since the power 
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested 
exclusively with the Board under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990). 
[7] Northern suggests that the Board's 
exercise of this discretionary authority is 
now subject to judicial review under the 
recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, 808 P£d 734 (Utah 1991). We 
disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an 
extraordinary writ, contending "that the 
manner in which his parole hearings have 
been conducted [had] deprived him of pro-
cedural due process." Id. The Utah Su-
preme Court held that, under the Utah 
Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due 
est, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and, 
because of the brief time any one person is 
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial 
review...." Wickham v. fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1981). 
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process in proceedings before the Board, without merit 
Id. at 735. The supreme court then re-
ferred the case to a trial court to ascertain 
factually "the procedures followed by the 
board" and to decide what is procedurally 
required in "the conduct of the parole hear-
ings." Id. Since Northern was afforded 
full procedural due process by the July 8, 
1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural 
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole 
date were remedied before this petition 
was filed. Northern's claim relates, there-
fore, not to the procedural due process 
issues outlined in Foote, but to the reason-
ableness of the Board's decision in not 
granting Northern credit for the time 
served beyond his original parole date. 
[8] Termination of Northern's sentence 
is triggered by "completion of three years 
on parole outside of confinement and with-
out violation . . . unless the person is earli-
er terminated by the Board of Pardons." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(1) (1990). 
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a 
hearing . . . concerning revocation of parole 
constitutes service of sentence" rather 
than time on parole. Section 76-3-
202(3Xc). Since the Board has discretion to 
parole or discharge an inmate at any time, 
see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given 
Northern a parole period of less than three 
years and thereby credited him for the time 
served while incarcerated beyond his origi-
nal parole date. We deem the Board's 
decision to not give Northern an earlier 
release date an exercise of its discretion. 
The Board's right to rely on any factors 
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the 
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be 
afforded such factors in deciding whether 
Northern posed a societal risk, as well as 
whether an order of restitution was appro-
priate, are all matters within the discretion 
of the Board. They are precisely the kinds 
of issues that are not subject to judicial 
review under section 77-27-5(3). Accord-
ingly, we hold that habeas corpus is not 
available in this case as a post release 
remedy to modify the release date ordered 
by the Board. 
We have reviewed the remaining issues 
raised on appeal and deem them to be 
Utah 699 
See State v. Carter, 776 
P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (it is within our 
discretion to "analyze and address in writ-
ing each and every argument, issue, or 
claim raised"). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the writ is 
affirmed. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
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William Eluie CASTNER, II and Bonnie 
Lee Castner, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 910275-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 24, 1992. 
Driver and passenger were convicted 
in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne 
County, Dennis L. Draney, J., of drug-relat-
ed offenses. Driver and passenger appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that (1) request to search for second ve-
hicle identification number on door post 
was not reasonably related to issuance of 
speeding ticket; (2) driver voluntarily con-
sented to search of vehicle; (3) taint from 
illegal search for door post number had 
dissipated; and (4) consent to search ve-
hicle extended to contents of containers 
found in vehicle and trunk. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred in result only. 
TabC 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION ( J F ~ — — i..^rrORD6R OF PAROLE 
KENDALL NORTHERN I M ^ I l I ft T'fUTAH STATE PRISON NQ. 15009 
PAROLE PRIVATE 
The matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence havinq come before tr 
Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly &*~*"J"* >• ' i »" »*"»
 M ft; fa, day of Ju ly 1SP1 and th 
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to appearance and the Board having heard t! 
case, issues the following order: 
It Is herby ordered that K e n d a l l N o r t h e r n
 b e p a r o l e d f r o m t h c punjshment and sentenc 
heretofore imposed upon him by a judge of the 3rd Judical District Court in and for the County of Sa 11 L* 
for the crime of C r i m i n a l Homicide ,. Murder JLn the, ...2nd d e g r e e , , 1 s t , degree 
felony(5 y£ars - life) Aggravated Robbery^ 1st degree (5 years - life) ^ 
Consecutively 
Theparole shall not become effective until the 1 0 t h day of May 19JLI 
The applicant agrees to the following conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the certificate, Tl 
parole agreement or contract shall be administered by the duly authorized agent of the Utah State Adult Probatic 
and Parole Department in and for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be quilty of any infractions of the rul 
and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prist 
or is found to be In violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then tr 
Order of Parole or Termination of Sentence is revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this fith day of J » l v 19_fiJL_. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 9 th day of J u l y 196} 
reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature as Executive Secretary for and on beh« 
of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
Lir  as t Uu  r t r  f r  
^RY LTOWEBSTER, Executive GARY L. WEBSTER, Executive Secreta 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
I, KENDALL NORTHERN Hereby agree to abide by the followii 
conditions of my parole: 
1. I will make a written report, in person, to my Supervising Officer by the fifth day of each and every mont 
or more often if requested to do so. 
2. I will follow my Supervising Officer's instructions. 
3. I will submit to a search of my person, auto, place of residence of any other property under my control 
any time of the day or night, without a warrant, upon reasonable cause, as ascertained by an agent of Adi 
Probation and Parole, to insure compliance with the conditions of parole. 
4. I will seek and maintain legitimate employment and/or participate in a program approved by my Supervise 
Officer. 
5. I will obey ail local, State and Federal laws, and at all times conduct myself as a responsible, lawabidii 
citizen. I further agree to report any arrests or citations to my Supervising Officer within 72 hours of o 
currence. 
6. I will abstain from the illegal use, possession or distribution of narcotics, dangerous drugs, controlled sis 
stances or related paraphernalia. I further agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for narcotics or chert 
cal agents upon the request of my Supervising Officer. 
7. I will not receive, possess, transport, or have under my control any firearm, explosive or other dangero 
weapon. 
8. I will obtain written consent from Utah Adult Probation and Parole before leaving the State of Utah. It 
expressly acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written authority from Adult Prob 
tion and Parole that I hereby waive extradition, from any state in which I may be found, tc the State 
Utah. p r} <-\ >» r> 
9. I will inform my Supervising Officer of my intent to change employment/residence. ' u 
10. To avoid association with any person wno nas oeen convicted of a felony. 
11.1 will abide by the following special conditions: 
I understand and agree that should f violate any of the above conditions, falsify reports required of me, or f 
to follow the orders of my Supervising Officer, I shall be subject to arrest as provided by law. 
I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and have received a copy of this agreement. 
- — - ~
 T n i s d a y o f 19_ 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY JAIL 
INMATE INFRACTION REPORT 
TYPE OF INFRACTION RULE # INMATES NAME 
Using Controlled Substance Ken Northern 
#15009 
DATE AND TIME OCCURRED LOCATION OP OCCURRENCE 
2-25-88 Duchesne County Jail 
TOl DATE 4 TIME REPORTING HOUSING 
Sheriff Clair Poulson 2-25-P3 #9 
DETAILS! * OF PRIORS 
On 2-25-88 Marijuana was brought into the Duchesne County 
Jail by a County Inmate. Joon further investigation it was found 
that inmate William Byrd obtained a drug and gave some of it to 
inmte Ken Northern. Innate Northern admitted to using the drug. 
REPORTING OFFICERS? Sgt Veldon Lefler 
FOLLOW UP INVESTIGATION! DATEl TIMEi 
2-25-88 
Inmate Northern admitted to smoking the Marijuana and was 
placed on dead lock down for 5 days with the loss of visiting and 
phone privileges. 
DISPOSITION! MINOR INFRACTION (CLASS C) 
SIGNATURE DATE 
DISPOSITION! C&IM-fNAtr-VJOLATIONS (CLASS A) AND/OR MAJOR 
INFRACTION^CLASS BJ 
Northern was olaced on locki down for 5 days. 
DATE 
Northern v Barnes et. al. 
900901905 HC ,j , 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL E V A L U A T I Q M ^ ^ <&& 
MAME: Kendall Quinn Northern G^rt * \ o ^ 
DATE: 5 May 1988 ^ ^ifcO* 
USP#: 15009 **>cP^ 
REASON FOR EVALUATION: Request of the Utah State Board of Pardons to aid in determining 
suitability of inmate for release on parole. 
ASSESSMENT MODALITIES USED: Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Driggs 
Developmental Inventory, BiPolar Psychological Inven-
tory Report, Psychological Interview. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Northern is the youngest of four children born to Donald 
and Claire Northern. He is a well-nourished, healthy-looking white male 26 years of 
age. He reports his childhood was fairly uneventful except that he was always heavy 
and big for his age. His size appears to have caused him difficulty psychologically 
since he felt he never could fit in with others and attributes his initiation into the 
drug culture to the fact that "they would accept anybody, just as long as they took 
drugs." Mr. Northern's home life was reported as stable with major moves to Arizona 
and California as a youth. At 16 Mr. Northern left home to wander the western states 
and became more deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. He stated that he 
was high on LSD at the time he commited his crime. Among drugs that Mr. Northern 
admitted to using were LSD, cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other 
drugs such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory. He said he had no 
alcohol abuse problem. He is single with no children. 
As a prison Inmate Mr. Northern has had disciplinary write ups for his drug usage, 
but that behavior has been absent from his jacket for at least the past four years. 
He is presently incarcerated at the Duchesne County Jail where he is reported to be 
a model inmate according to staff. He was transferred to the Duchesne facility two 
years ago as a protective measure. While at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne, Mr. 
Northern maintained an excellent volunteer and work record. 
INTERVIEW BEHAVIOR: Mr. Northern was yery verbal and cooperative during the assess-
ment interview. It was obvious that he was anxious about the situation, but soon 
calmed down after venting his frustrations about the status of his upcoming parole. 
He was quite open about his past history and reflective about the consequences of 
his past crime. He was very insistant about having drug therapy in addition to any 
mental health therapy ordered by the Board, viewing his drug dependancy as a major 
factor in his anti-social behavior. 
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: No I.Q. tests were administered to Mr. Northern at this 
time. However, he presents himself as an articulate, intelligent, and well-read 
individual. This impression is consistent with earlier testing which placed his 
overall IQ at 129 (superior range). While at the prison Mr. Northern completed his 
Associate of Arts in Business degree and three technical training courses offered 
by the prison. 
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PERSONALITY INTEGRATION: Testing showed that Mr. Northern was honest in answering 
test questions and tended to be overly truthful. He definitely feels proud about 
his abilities and has high self-esteem, security, self-satisfaction, and a positive 
self-image. He displays an open attitude in listening to and accepting help, and 
has a willingness to discuss himself and his problems and cooperate with professional 
health-care deliverers. He is mildly independent, non-conforming and may have 
difficulty in expressing anger or hostility in a modulated fashion. He is energetic 
and active with rebellious traits in his attitudes and behaviors. 
RECOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: Overall, Mr. Northern has shown a great deal of 
growth and maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this maturing may 
be due to age, but an important aspect of his growth can be attributed to the social 
interactions and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at the Duchesne 
County Jail. He has been given more responsibility and respect than at any other 
time of his life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a responsible adult. 
L 
Mr. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this time. His major problem 
is his capacity to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal substances. 
He fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address drug issues as part of his 
parole agreement. 
Although Mr. Northern can be physically and verbally imposing, he does not appear to 
have the capacity for violent acting out. He can be argumentative and assertive, 
but responds to authority when necessary. 
It is this writerfs recomendation that Mr. Northern, if he is paroled, be placed in 
a supportive environment such as family or friends to make transition to society as 
uneventful as possible. It is strongly recomended that, in addition to any mental 
health treatment, Mr. Northern receive drug abuse counseling. 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED 
AS A FAVORABLE ONE. 
E. Ted Brandhurst, Ph.D. At Carlisle, Ph.D. 
Associate Psychologist Chief Clinical Psychologist 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
C. Dane Nolan (4891) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents 
6100 South 300 East Suite 403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH 
STATE PRISON AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
: 
t 
• • 
m • 
i 
: 
: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 900901925HC 
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for 
trial on July 27, 1990, the plaintiff/petitioner KENDALL Q. 
NORTHERN being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE, the defendants/respondents being 
represented by counsel, C. DANE NOLAN, Assistant Attorney 
General, the Court having heard testimony and accepted 
documentary evidence, the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, the Court having reviewed the entire case file and being 
1 
fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Northern is presently incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison. On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, he was convicted of 
Criminal Homicide-Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony, and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and 
sentenced to two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State Prison. 
2. On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern attended a hearing before 
the Utah Board of Pardons. After the hearing the Board of 
Pardons determined that Mr. Northern should be paroled from the 
Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988. 
3. During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr. 
Northern had had a serious drug problem and that he had abused 
drugs heavily during the first two years of his incarceration. 
This information was new information in that it was not available 
to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
4. On September 24, 1984 the Board of Pardons considered 
Mr. Northern's incarceration status, including a caseworker's 
recommendation to shorten his term of incarceration, and 
determined that he should not be released on parole prior to the 
scheduled parole date of May 10, 1988. 
5. In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the 
2 
Duchesne County Jail. He gained trustee status quickly and 
during the next two years worked outside of the jail. Frequently 
this was unsupervised work including substantial periods of time 
when he labored on the farm of the elderly mother of Mr. Ralph 
Stansfield. At another location he helped construct a fire 
station. During these periods he never attempted to escape. 
6. Also, on February 25, 1988 Mr. Northern was discovered 
using marijuana by jail authorities. This fact was reported to 
the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of 
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. This information was new 
information in that it was not available to the Board of Pardons 
on July 8, 1981. 
7. On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested 
that the Utah State Prison perform a Psychological Assessment 
upon Mr. Northern and supply that information to the Board of 
Pardons. 
8. On May 5, 1988 the Board of Pardons received a 
Psychological Evaluation performed by Dr. Al Carlisle, Chief 
Clinical Psychologist at the Utah State prison, and his assistant 
Dr. E. Ted Branthurst. The evaluation indicated that at age 16 
Mr. Northern had left home to wander the western states and 
became deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. It 
noted that Mr. Northern admitted that he was high on LSD at the 
3 
time he committed his crime and that he had used LSD, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and marijuana. The report also stated that Mr. 
Northern viewed his drug dependency as a major factor in his 
anti-social behavior. The report indicated that Northern's major 
problem was his inability to deal with life's stresses without 
the use of illegal substances. 
9. In Northern's favor the psychologists noted that while 
at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne County Jail, Northern 
maintained an excellent volunteer and work record, had an I.Q. in 
the superior range, and had completed his Associate of Arts in 
Business and three technical training courses offered by the Utah 
State Prison. The evaluation also noted that Northern had shown 
growth and maturing since his evaluation in 1984 and did not 
appear to have the capacity for violent acting out. The 
psychologists closed the report with a statement that "for 
purposes of the Board of Pardons determinations, this report is 
to be regarded as a favorable one." 
10. This information contained in the May 5, 1988 
Psychological Evaluation was new information in that it was not 
available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
11. During his 1984 written request for redetermination to 
the Board of Pardons Mr. Northern did not express any remorse 
about the crimes he had committed or the victims of his crimes. 
4 
12. In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies 
in effect which governed its actions and proceedings. In May 
1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as 
follows: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the 
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written 
referral indicating that the offender is in violation 
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison, 
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local, 
state or federal government, or new evidence is 
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a 
serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing 
date, information shall be provided to the Board 
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. 
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be 
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be 
notified of all allegations and the date of the 
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance. 
13. On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr. 
Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date. Prior to that 
rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating 
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's 
action on May 9, 1988. In the document detailing the rescission 
the Board made the following remark: "Continue for another 
psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report". 
14. The second psychological report was prepared on May 11, 
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1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern, Gail Caldwell. 
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with 
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that 
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father, 
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them 
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled. 
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he 
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to 
help him adjust to life outside of prison. 
15. On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a 
hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status. Mr. 
Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988. 
16. On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the 
hearing. At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address 
the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to 
respond to questioning from the Board. 
17. At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons 
affirmed the rescission of Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole 
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for 
"appropriate punishment", and rescheduled a rehearing for May, 
1990. 
18. On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the 
Duchesne County Jail. On October 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons, 
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because of Mr. Northern's escape, rescinded Mr. Northern's May 
1990 scheduled rehearing. 
19. Subsequently Mr. Northern was captured and returned to 
the Utah State Prison. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate 
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider 
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its 
jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate. 
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board 
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside 
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a 
constitutional right of the offender. 
It is well established that an offender has no right to be 
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons. However, once a 
parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the 
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim 
of the Board members. 
The question presented by this case is whether there is a 
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to 
rescind Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date. Board Rule 3.10 
(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this 
7 
question. It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an 
offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral 
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution 
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if 
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the 
community. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written 
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had 
violated institutional rules. Thus, that portion of Rule 3.10 is 
inapplicable. Additionally, the grant of parole had not been 
rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of 
institutional rules. 
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court 
defines "new evidence" as negative information received by the 
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is 
set and the time that a rescission determination is made. In 
this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This 
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the 
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime. 
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case 
and keeping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is 
8 
that there was "new evidence" received by the Board of Pardons 
which justified the Board's decision to rescind Mr. Northern's 
May 10, 1988 parole date. There was evidence regarding Mr. 
Northern's drug use at the Utah State Prison and drug use at the 
Duchesne County Jail. Such drug use was illegal. There was also 
evidence which showed that Mr. Northern failed to show any 
remorse for his victim or regarding the crimes he had committed 
and that his behavior was, to some extent, anti-social. This new 
evidence indicated that, if released, Mr. Northern would present 
a serious risk or danger to the community. 
Also, the circumstances relating to Mr. Northern on May 9, 
1990, constituted extraordinary circumstances under Rule 3.10 
which justified the rescission of the parole date without 
providing prior notice to Mr. Northern. 
Additionally, a review of the entire record leads the Court 
to conclude that the Board of Pardons did not rescind Mr. 
Northern's parole release date because it believed he deserved to 
be incarcerated for a longer period of time because of the nature 
of his crime. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
For the reasons set forth above, the Board of Pardons did 
not violate Mr. Northern's constitutional rights. The petition 
9 
for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore', denied with prejudice. 
DATED THIS j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, /990. 
rUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ATTEST . ^ ..^ 
JOTpAROL NESSET-SAliE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff & Petitioner, 
v. 
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, 
UTAH STATE PRISON AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
THROUGH THE BOARD OF PARDONS 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
ALTERNATIVELY A WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS OR DECLARATORY 
JUDGEMENT 
Case No . ^ o o ? o i ^ 5 ^ e -jQBGE m m R, H/uisoe 
The Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern by and through his 
attorney Jo Carol Nesset-Sale of Haley & Stolebarger hereby files 
this petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or 
Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment and complains that 
for reasons set forth below he is illegally restrained of his 
liberty by the Defendants: 
Jurisdiction 
1. This action is made pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(2,4) and (f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Article I, Sections 5, 7, 
9, 8, 11, and 18 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, 
Sec. 78-33-1 et seq. (Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended), and Sec. 
78-12-25(1), (Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended). 
r*€\'i~\<*\ 
VENUE 
2. Venue is properly in the Third Judicial District Court 
as Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereinafter "Petitioner") is 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison and the acts complained of 
by the Board of Pardons occurred in Salt Lake County; in addition 
the damage as a result of Defendant's breach of contract exceeds 
$10,000• No other complaint for this relief has been considered 
by another court or is pending in another court. 
3. On July 28# 1980, Petitioner, then aged eighteen, was 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the following terms, based 
upon Petitioner's pleas of guilty to the following offenses: 
Second Degree Murder - five year to life, and Aggravated Robbery 
- five years to life, the terms to run consecutively. 
4. On July 8, 1981, Petitioner appeared before the Board of 
Pardons of the State of Utah and was given a parole date of May 
10, 1988. 
5. In January 1986 Petitioner requested a transfer to a 
county jail, given his protective status at the Utah State 
Prison, and was recommended by his Unit Management Team for 
transfer, the team noting that Petitioner had not been a 
management problem. He was denied transfer on January 23, 1986. 
6. In March 1986 the Unit Management team again recommended 
his transfer, with a specific recommendation of the Duchesne 
County Jail. On March 27, 1986, Petitioner was transferred to 
the Duchesne County Jail. 
7. Petitioner acquitted himself well at the Duchesne County 
Jail, earning trustee status that permitted him to be on 
C0003 
assignments outside of the jail facility, and in March, April, 
and early May of 1988 provided valuable assistance in setting up 
a photography lab for Lt. Ralph Stansfield. 
8. The inmate report on Petitioner submitted to the Utah 
State Prison by the Duchesne County Jail Commander for March and 
April 1988 noted Petitioner's "excellent job" on the photography 
lab, that he "gets along well with others", and his anxious 
anticipation of his May 10, 1988, release date. 
9. On March 29, 1988, Petitioner's Social Service Worker 
recommended Early Release, with Petitioner requiring no special 
parole conditions and having no special problems. 
10. On April 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons, through its 
Hearing Officer Paul Larsen, reviewed a written statement of 
Petitioner in which he requested parole to Arizona, his home 
state, where his parents and employment awaited him, and made an 
Interim Decision that added to Petitioner's general terms and 
conditions of parole the following special conditions: 
a) that he complete Intensive Supervision Parole ("ISP") 
if available in Utah; 
b) that the following additional special conditions of 
supervision be added in the receiving state (if he were 
paroled out of Utah) 
1. random urinalysis; 
2. complete mental health therapy; 
3. maintain full-time employment or have full-time 
student status; 
4. maintain nighttime (7:00 p.m.) curfew for the 
first six months. 
11. On May 9, 1988, without notice to Petitioner and 
without giving him an opportunity to be present or be heard; and 
without the convening of a hearing; ctnd without a record having 
been made; the Board of Pardons rescinded by minute entry 
Petitioner's parole date that was to have become effective the 
following day. 
12. On July 8, 1988# the Board of Pardons conducted a 
Special Attention hearing. Petitioner, who requested and was 
denied permission to have counsel, was present and made a 
statement. The Board affirmed its rescission of his May 10 
parole date, based upon Petitioner's risk to society and the 
members' concern that Petitioner's punishment by appropriate for 
his crime. He was given a May 10, 1990, rehearing date. 
13. On October 9# 1988, Petitioner left the Duchesne County 
Jail without permission. He was captured in Canada and returned 
to Utah on or about October 6, 1989. 
First Cause of Action 
14. The Utah Board of Pardons violated its written policies 
and procedures when on May 9# 1988, it rescinded Petitioner's 
parole date of May 10, 1988; to wit: 
a. The Board's written policy 3.10, dated July 14# 1986, 
part of the Utah Administrative Code, mandated that an 
inmate's release date established by the Board of 
Pardons shall remain in effect unless: 1) the Board 
receives a written referral of the inmate's violation 
of prison regulations or criminal laws or 2) the Board 
Cnr.ntr 
receives new evidence that the inmate is a danger to 
the community. Neither exception was the basis for 
Petitioner's rescission. 
b. The procedural section of 3.10 requires that before the 
Board rescinds a parole, it must have received 
information that can form the basis for rescission. No 
such information was received in Petitioner's case. 
c. The same section requires that the inmate be given at 
least seven days notice of the rescission hearing, 
except under extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner 
was given no notice, no hearing was held, and no 
extraordinary circumstances existed. The nature of his 
offense had been known by the Board for at least seven 
years. 
d. The same section requires the Board, and not a single 
hearing officer, to hear all rescission proceedings 
involving crimes against persons. Yet Paul Larsen 
alone conducted the April 9, 1988, hearing, which was 
designated a Special Attention hearing, but appears to 
have been treated by the Board as a rescission hearing 
under 3.10, as the Board itself never met on May 9, 
1988, when Petitioner's parole date was rescinded. 
Consequently the Board violated its own procedures by 
treating Larsen's interim decision as part of a 
rescission procedure (rather than a Special Attention 
procedure), thereby circumventing the requirement that 
the Board hear all rescissions involving crimes against 
persons, and by failing to meet as a Board to conduct 
its own hearing. 
e. That same section permits the Board to review a hearing 
officer's interim decision and approve, modify, or 
overturn it only when the "violation consists of a new 
complaint or conviction for a non-violent felony, 
misdemeanor, or an adjudicated violation of rules or 
regulations." The Board had received no information of 
such a basis for rescission, so the predicate violation 
was the felony offense that had brought Petitioner to 
the prison eight years earlier. Consequently, the 
Board could not review the interim decision of a 
hearing officer but had to conduct its own hearing. 
f. Under this same section, whim of the Board is not a 
lawful basis for rescission of an inmate's parole date; 
yet the Board's July 9, 1988, action states its 
rescission was based upon its perception that 
Petitioner had simply not been punished enough for his 
crime. 
Second Cause of Action 
15. On July 8, 1981, the Board of Pardons entered into a 
contract with Petitioner. 
16. The terms of the contract were that Petitioner would be 
paroled on May 10, 1988, subject to certain terms and conditions, 
in consideration for which Petitioner would not violate certain 
rules and regulations of the prison. 
17. During the period of the contract, Petitioner never 
COG 
received notice that he had engaged in any conduct that nullified 
or revoked his parole date# and the Petitioner's inmate record 
does not indicate any misconduct that the Board determined to 
have revoked or nullified the contract. 
18. According to the record of its July 8# 1988, hearing 
the Board rescinded Petitioner's parole date for factors that 
existed at the time of his 1981 parole hearing and were related 
exclusively to the nature of the crime committed. 
19. Consequently, the Board breached its contract with 
Petitioner by not paroling Petitioner on May 9, 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court declare his post-
May 10, 1988, confinement in the Utah State Prison unlawful, 
order the Utah Board of Pardons to direct the warden to forthwith 
release him on parole with transfer to Arizona for his 1980 
convictions, that he be awarded attorney's fees, damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial but not less than $10,000.00 and any 
other appropriate relief in equity or in law that the Court may 
determine. 
Petitioner further prays that the Court schedule a hearing 
on his claims as soon as the matter can be heard. 
DATED this JLb^day of March, 1990. 
Jo/Carol Nesset-Sale 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^j& day of March 1990 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint and Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or 
Declaratory Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Dane Olsen 
Utah State Board of Pardons 
6100 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF fflffiTTTCRNi *™ff)M.T. (JITTNM 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 15QQ2 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence 
aviog come before the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 9th 
ay of July, 1991, and the applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right 
o appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that NORTHERN, KENDALL QUINN be paroled from the punishment and 
entence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the Third Judicial District Court in 
nd for the County of Salt Lake for the crime(s) of MURDER II, 1st degree felony, Expiration 
JFE; AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, \ s t degree felony. Expiration LIFE; ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY, 2nd degree 
elony, Expiration 07/19/06. 
The parole shall not become effective until the 9th day of July, 1991- The applicant 
igrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the parole 
igreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be administered by duly authorized agents 
>f the Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty 
of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or 
refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prison or is found to be in violation 
of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this 
Order of Parole is revoked and becomes null and void-
Dated this 9th Day of July, 1991. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the St«t~ ••' V ••»'•. I have thir 8th d*»y o£ July, 1991, 
reduced its decision in this matter to writing en'.' »'*«.*by offix my sijmature as Chairman for 
and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
H.L- HAUN, Chairman 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
tti-(*ete)Haun 
Chairman 
'$&& \}$&}j) 
• » 
Memaers 
Donald E. Blanehard 
Michael FLSIbbett 
WtttlamL. Peters 
Heather H Cooke 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EAROLE AGREEMENT 
NORTHERN, KENDALL QUINN, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State 
partment of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State 
rrections, according to this Agreement. 
further agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any 
ditional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons , consistent with the 
ws of the State of Utah- I fxilly understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any 
nditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing 
parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over* 
CUND1U0NS OF PAROLE 
KEUEASE: 
EESHJEBGE: 
(MMDUCT: 
REPORT: 
EHPLOIHERT: 
SEARCH: 
WEAPONS: 
ASSOCIATION 
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement* I will 
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing. 
I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence 
in fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without 
prior knowledge of my Parole Agent* I shall not leave the State of Utah 
without prior written authorization from my Parole Agent. It is hereby 
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from ray Parole Agent, that I hereby waive extradition from any 
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah. 
I shall obey all State end Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. 
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth 
of each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place 
of residence as required by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring 
compliance with the "conditions of parole* 
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in 
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent. 
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my person* residence, vehicle, 
or any other property under my control, without a warrant, any time day or 
night, upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insn 
compliance with the conditions of my parole. 
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control any explosives, 
firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code Annotated* 
Section 76-10-501* as tended. 
I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can 
reasonably be expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or 
illegal activity* 
ure 
SPECIAL CONDITIONSz I shall: 
1 Submit to random drug testing* 2 Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. 
3 Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy. 
ft Successfully complete 1SE if avail where residing. 
5 Successfully complete CCC -unless accepted for compact supervision-
6 Pay restitution of 426*350.00 on case # CR80-26*-
have read, understand and agree to the above coutfili?ns and I hereby acknowledge receipt of 
copy of this Agreement. 
TNESSED BT 
TLE: SIGNED: 
Parolee . 
ADDRESS: I W*> <> #4*01 /jfirihT 
Ph&MrX. fits &S094 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
--—00O00-
Robert D. Preece, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
Ton House, et el.. 
Respondents and Appellants. 
PILED 
Utah Court of Appeab 
FEB 17 1993 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 920726-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 17, 1993) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Jan Graham, Janes H. Beadles and Lorenzo K. Miller, 
Salt LaXe City, for Appellants 
Robert D. Preece, Draper, Appellee Pro Se 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Oarff (Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on respondents' motion for a 
stay pending appeal of an order granting a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus and ordering the release of petitioner Robert D. 
Preece forthwith. In addition to opposing the stay, petitioner 
has moved this court for summary disposition of the appeal. In 
the interest of expediting a decision in this case, we deem it 
appropriate to address the merits of the appeal at this time. 
£ej& Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse the 
order of the district court, in part, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
The complaint filed by petitioner in the district court 
challenged the determination of his parole date by the Board or 
Pardons. The order of the trial court recites that the Boaro 
applied an internal guideline of 147 months in determining 
petitioner's release date of October 10, 1J94. /he Board 
subsequently learned that the actual guideline for **• °"*Ja?' 
was 111 months. Under that guideline, petitioner would have been 
entitled to release on parole on October 10, 1991. *$? d*"£" e t 
court continued proceedings on the petition to J^ 0" *** ?°!r* 
„ t o c o r r e ct the error or explain their reasons for deviating from 
the guidelines." The Board held a special attention hearing and 
reaffirmed the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994, 
without providing any written explanation for its decision, as 
required by its own internal rules. Sift R671-305-2, Utah 
Administrative Code (1992). 
Based upon the preceding facts, the trial court granted the 
petition and ordered petitioner's release "forthwith,11 stating: 
This court finds that under the circumstance 
of the error made as to the guidelines 
discussed with Petitioner that the Petitioner 
is entitled to an explanation of the error 
which the Board refuses to do. Further, due 
process requires fair process and a 
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of 
why the error should be ignored and the 
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual 
punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner 
has been denied due process and is being 
treated to cruel and unusual punishment when 
no correction or explanation is given am to 
the mistake and as to the time to be served 
by the Petitioner. 
Respondents contend that the trial court exceeded its 
authority in ordering the release of the petitioner as a remedy 
for the due process violation found by the court, and that the 
court should have proceeded in accordance with Rule 65B(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 6SB(e)(2)(B) provides that relief 
may be granted Hwhere an inferior court, administrative agency, 
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by 
law as a duty of office, trust or station.11 Respondents, 
accordingly, contend that the petition is not a proper petition 
for "wrongful imprisonment19 under Rule €5B(b) because it is not a 
challenge to the validity of the original commitment, and because 
petitioner is serving a valid sentence that has not been set 
aside on by any court on appeal or otherwise. 
Although we agree that the petitioner was entitled to a 
written explanation of the parole determination following the 
special attention hearing, we hold that the district court 
exceeded its authority in ordering the unconditional release of 
petitioner based upon the failure of the Board to comply with the 
prior orders of the court and its own procedural rules. Under 
our indeterminate sentencing system, the authority to determine 
parole dates is vested in the Board of Pardons. See Foote v. 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). While parole 
decisions are subject to habeas corpus review under Foote. this 
court has previously held that the scope of review is limited to 
920726-CA 2 
a review of procedural due process and does not extend authority 
for judicial review of the "reasonableness of the parole 
decision", which is not subject to judicial review under Utah 
code Ann. S 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1992)• Northern v. Barnes, 825 P,2d 
696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). We conclude that the appropriate 
remedy for the procedural due process violation found by the 
district court in this case is to require the Board expeditiously 
to provide the district court and petitioner with e written 
explanation of its reasons for the parole decision. See also 
R671-305-2, Utah Administrative Code (1992). To the extent that 
the district court's ruling is based upon a determination that 
the Board's guidelines are mandatory, that conclusion is an 
incorrect statement of the law tinder State v. Hall, 806 P.2d 217f 
218 (Utah App. 1991). 
The order of the district court is reversed insofar as it 
provides for unconditional release of petitioner from the custody 
of the Department of Corrections. The case is remanded to the 
district court with instructions to treat the petition under Rule 
65B(e). 
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PAUL w. BOYDEN T H E STATE OF UTAH PAUL w. SHEFFIELD. 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS
 u . . . , 
GARY L WEBSTER BOARD OF PARDONS Administrator 
6065 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OBSCtSNa. c-1500' 
Consideration of the Statue of I T - I T M \ r M^rTtirp" , Utah State Prison No. 1~- „.g 
The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the r--'- day of. , 
198 2 for consideration as: ' 
1. 
2. 
a 
4. 
P ORIGINAL HEARING 5. • SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD 
• REHEARING 6. M RESCISSION 
Q REDETERMINATION 7. Q 
• TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE 
After the statement of, and the following w'rtness(es) 
D 2) , 
and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision: 
E J Rescind f'av 1 0 . 19HS ,1 g parole date, 
• Parole to become effective , 19 , with the following special conditions: 
• Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions: 
1. 
Z. 
3. 
4. 
• Rehearing for , 19 , for the following reasons: 
• Termination of sentence and parole to become effective , 19_ 
Q Expiration of sentence , 19_ 
Continue for another psychological evaluation and conr/lote >:r1?on 
REMARKS^<-r ^^^r.«.» 
QJSOSl Sentence Case NO. tlUflflfi EXPJr.Datfl 
j . C r imina l Homicide W H f o tt?Q-?0' Pa lcV In U l " 
2. >''<:gravated kopoery f -< n,f">,.t- i.»" '.'•-."'' *'.itowin '."!•- -
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. ; 
It is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah Sta 
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is four* 
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void. 
• icy '••' 1SC3 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date "$ 198 affixed my 
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
Paul W. Sheffield, Administrator 
An application for redetermination may be made after one year from the Board's 
previous action. Appfcations may be obtained through a case worker. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
NAME: Kendall Quin Northern 
DIAGNOSTIC NUMBER: 1768P 
AGE: 18 OFFENSE: Aggravated Robbery (Criminal Homicide reportedly dropped) 
DIAGNOSTIC AGENT: Larry Hafeli 
COUNSELOR: Protective Custody, Utah State Prison 
DATE RECEIVED: 4/24/80 
INTERVIEWED: 6/13/80 (Utah State Prison) 
REPORT WRITTEN: 6/16/80 
DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS: Doppelt Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Bender 
Gestalt, Rorschach, Sentence Completion Form, Clinical Interview 
Ken Northern was not able to take our standard battery of tests because of his 
placement on Protection in the prison, but all available information indicates 
he commands above average intelligence and good literacy skills. Administration 
of a short-form WAIS yielded an I.Q. estimate of 128 in the Superior range, and 
Bender productions offered no indications of any organic impairment. Nothing 
in these test results or the interview situation suggested formal thought disorder, 
and Mr. Northern was well oriented in all three spheres. This data agrees generally 
with an earlier evaluation by Marcel C. Chappuis, with my somewhat higher obtained 
I.Q. being partially the result of a practice effect and perhaps partially the 
result of my using a shorter version of the test. In any case, we can confidently 
state that Mr. Northern is a bright young man in full control of his mental facultie 
I have no actual police arrest record available, but Mr. Northern reports only 
one prior arrest as a juvenile and no history whatsoever of drug or alcohol abuse. 
There is no available information to suggest that either alcohol or drugs played 
a part in the current crime, although I am curious what the two co-defendants were 
actually doing during the time they were "just riding around" prior to the commissic 
of this offense, 
A current MMPI is not available, but assuming the accuracy of the earlier reported 
4-6 elevation, this would not be a typical or classic antisocial personality so 
much as an individual deeply involved in latent and very personal hostility. 
Rorschach responses corroberated the impression of paranoid-type ideation essential 
supporting a highly explosive inner rage. Mr. Northern maintains that he did not 
shoot the victim and had no knowledge of any intent to shoot, yet this personality 
is such that an erruption of pent-up aggressive rage would be fully consistent. 
The Rorschach did not indicate any basically oppositional or antisocial features 
per se, but did suggest considerable internal distress with the father-figure --
which could certainly result in antisocial acting-out behaviors. Nothing could be 
elecited to explain this dynamic beyond Mr. Northern's saying he used to feel con-
tempt for his businessman father's staid and conventional ways, but that now he 
feels very different and is thankful for parental support. I suspect that some 
problems between father and son extend far back into childhood, and wish we had 
more information on the history of this family. 
Northern v Barnes et. al. 
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Testing conditions on the Protection Unit did not allow as extensive an 
evaluation as we would have wished, yet there is enough information to 
indicate serious causes for distress. Perhaps the most alarming aspect 
of our interview was that not once did Mr. Norther ever express any concern 
over the death of the victim — only exasperation over the "dumb" nature of 
the robbery, and considerable frustration that his agreeing to testify has not 
resulted in a "better deal" for himself. This in itself is diagnostic, since 
a good psychopath at this intellectual level would easily and automatically 
feign the expected remorse. 
Mr. Northern is obviously not able to cope with the rigors of the Utah State 
Prison environment, yet he is a danger to society. He really belongs in the 
Public Offenders Program at Provo. If they refuse to accept him, however, 
incarceration may have to be considered with hopes that he can eventually 
be worked into the Youthful Offenders Program at the prison. 
Diagnostic Impression: Superior intelligence; no evidence of organicity, 
psychosis or substance abuse; Paranoid-type Personality with highly explosive 
latent rage and antisocial acting-out features. 
,R0L S. BACHSTETTER, M.A. 
inical Psychologist 
CSB:js 
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ADDENDUM L 
90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS 
Date Referred: April 24, 1980 Date IXie: July 23, I9S0 
JUDGE ERNEST F. BALDWIN THIRD QLSTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UTAH 
iCrm (COJMIY) 
NAME: NORTHERN, Kendall Quinn (Age 18) COURT CASE NO.: CR80-264 
PROSECUTOR: Michael Christensen 
OFFENSE: Aggravated Robbery, Felony I DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Robert Van Sciver 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in 
the 2nd Degree, Felony I 
IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS: 
I. Kendall Northern has pleaded guilty to two violent offenses, 
Aggravated Robbery and Criminal Homicide. According to the Salt 
Lake City Police Department, the defendant along with Robert Alan 
Phillips robbed and murdered Everett Hamby, Jr., a taxi driver,~ 
Evidence indicates that it was rne flfitfiTldant, Kendall northern, 
who purchased the gun used by Mr. Phillips' as well as a gun he 
carried during, commission or the KoDDery. The rieffTlrffln1> pnrrhafted 
these weapons with a forged cnecK. Addlllunally, according to the 
Probable Cause Statement included in the Complaint, "Both suspects 
admitted that Phillips was holding the !RG .557 Magnum1 pistol 
when Hamby was shot first in the head by Phillips, and then "at 
NdrTRefti's allege insistence. Phillips shot llamby a second"and 
thira time to* BiaKe* Slire he was dead. " 
II. According to the records of the Second District Juvenile Court in 
Salt Lake City, the defendant has a prior juvenile arrest record 
in Maricopa CountyT Arizona. At the time he was arrested lfl fglerence 
to the present charge, the defendant was wanted in Arizona in reference 
to charges of Receiving .Stolen Property. Fhiralary, and Theft of a 
Vehicle. Additionally, the defendant had prior arrests as a juvenile 
foTTrobation Violation Pptt7"Yhetr. anrt Vnett ot a Vehicle. 
III. Mr. Northern was also charged with 13 Counts of Forgery according 
to the records of the Utah Bureau ot criminal investigation. IT" is 
this agent's understanding that there was an agreement not to 
prosecute in reference to fhe^e1 WlUi'UIJk Uk TS5TT flf 3* TTle'a agreement 
in the present case. ~ 
IV. According to a psychological evaluation prepared by the staff 
psychologist at the Diagnostic Unit, the defendant was characterized 
as a "paranoid-type personality with highly explosive latent ra^e 
an? antisocial UULUlfl *uui fc<jiuius." ^UlTTTerte sting suggested 
"considerable internal distress with the father figure which could 
certainly result in antisocial acting-out behaviors." According to 
a psychological evaluation prepared by Mr. Marcel Chappuis for the 
Juvenile Court, "It appears that Ken is functioning in the top 
ten percentile intellectually with"specitic strengths in tne areas 
oY comprehension and problem reasnmnp." According to Mr. breck Le-
Benne. M.n. . and m r ^ t n r nf Fnren^ir Psvrhiatrir Servicer at the 
Tfn-ivor^^r nf m-ah, tKo ^ o^n^^t ic
 ar> QrM-^o^-jal personality and 
is basically untreatable. However, some individuals are treatable 
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IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM .AREAS: (Continued) 
and "this is possible only if they are held in custody in an 
extremely controlled and structured environment for a great mam-
years, and may be accomplished only by an arduous process of 
restructuring the antisocial-criminal personality into a personality 
more socially acceptable." 
V. Possessing a tenth grade education, the records of the Second District 
Juvenile Cnurt r^^rt tha t thfi riflfmrifln1" wa<; a hghav-irvral prpMfm " 
early as elementary school. The defendant began having serious 
behavioral problems at age 14 and dropped out of high school in the 
tenth graded An'cittempt was then made to send the defendant to a 
parochial school; however, that failed. Mr. Northern has wnrWpH 
periodically and there were some shprt periods nf p^pim/mont with 
his "parents. It i5 Important to note that the defendant came to Salt 
Lake City while in the employ of a moving firm, and established a 
residence in Salt Lake City utilizing an alias of Edward C. Duffany. 
The defendant did assume employment under the name of Mr. Duffany. 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO PRESENTENCE INVESTTGATION REPORT; 
On April 24, 1980 Kendall Quinn Northern piffled guilty to a charge of 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, and Criminal Homi HHflflfnr3?r ?. 
aLso a First \)evree helonv. Thp dpfgndant did nor** tr> ratify against the 
co-defendant in this case, Robert Alan Phillips. The defendant was reterred 
for a 9U-[)ay evaluation on April z4. 198Q without benefit of a Presentence 
Investigation Report; therefore, the following information is submitted for 
the Court's consideration. 
INFORMATION: 
COUNT I 
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1980, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the said Kendall Ouin Northern 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Everett Hamby, 
or acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of said offense, solicited, requested.commanded, encouraged, 
or intentionally aiTIed Robert Alan Phillips to caused trie". ' 
deatn or tverett Hampy, Jr. while the defendant was engaged in 
Ltm tUUHHlsi,i6n gr <ff 5T1 ULUfllipi LU LUliUliL. ui tlighf jitter " 
cofflTfl-LLlnfl or attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery; 
COUNT II 
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1980, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said Kendall Quin 
Northern unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
P r 0 P e r tI. in the POSsessioYi^of Everett Hamby Jr. at or 
near 2700 West 900 South, from the pe^s6n Ax1 immediate 
presence of Everett Hamby Jr., apainst his win, fry the 
use of force pr fpar. and \j\ the commission of same did 
use a firearmL 
NOTE: As was previously indicated, the defendant was also arrested for 
a number of counts of Forgery, As part of a plea agreement arrange-
ment, the defendant will not be charged in reference to those 
Forgery counts. 
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OFTENSE: 
A. OFFICLU VERSION: 
According to the records of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office 
as well as the Salt Lake City Police Department, Detective Carl Voyles 
was assigned to the criminal homicide investigation in reference to 
Everett Hamby, Jr. Mr. Hamby's body was found on January 1, 1980 at 
9:30 p.m. at 2^00 West 900 South in Salt Lake County. He was employed 
as a cab driver for City Cab Company. The body was found to contain 
three bullet holes and Mr. Hamby was pronounced dead at the scene. 
According to an autopsy, the cause of death was three gunshot wounds 
any one of which would have caused death. One of the bullets found 
in the chest cavity was a .38 or .357 caliber. Further evidence 
indicated that barrel markings on the bullet were consistent with 
those of a barrel configuration found in the pistol production of an 
RG, Model 57, caliber .357. 
Records further indicate that on January 9, 1980, while serving a 
Felony arrest warrant on Edward C. Duffany for Bad Checks, Officers 
made contact with Kendall Quinn Northern, the defendant. It was 
determined that Mr. Northern had been using the alias of Edward 
Duffany to pass bad checks. On December 23, 1979, the defendant, 
using the name of Duffany, had purchased an RG, Model 57 .357 Magnum 
pistol matching the description of the possible murder weapon. 
Mr. Northern was identified as passing that check to Gibson's by 
store employees. -
Mr. Northern was advised of his rights per Miranda and stated that 
he was present on January 1, 1980 and observed the Robbery and shooting 
of Mr. Hamby. The defendant named Robert Alan Phillips, his roommate, 
as the individual responsible. 
Salt Lake officers then went to American Auto Parts in South Salt 
Lake and arrested Mr. Phillips. Both suspects admitted and confessed 
to their respective involvement in the homicide of Mr. Hamby and both 
admitted that they intended to rob Hamby and, in fact, took $26 before 
Hamby was shot. "Both suspects admitted that Phillips was holding 
the 'RG .357 Magnum1 pistol when Hamby was shot first in the head by 
Phillios, and then at Northern's alleged insistence, Phillips shot 
Hamby a second and third time to make sure he was dead.M After the 
shooting both suspects took Mr. Hamby's cab and money and drove to 
Trolley Square where they were observed abandoning the cab. 
Subsequent search of the residence at 837 South 400 East, Apart-
ment 1-B, belonging to the defendant and Mr. Phillips, disclosed a 
Rohm .357 pistol that Phillips and Northern stated Northern had used 
to force the cab driver Hamby from his cab for purposes of talcing his 
money and cab. 
CO-DEFENDANT'S DISPOSITION: (Please refer to attached.) 
B. DEFENDANT'S STATB1ENT: 
When interviewed for purposes of this 90-Day Diagnostic Evaluation 
and questioned regarding his involvement in this offense, Mr. Northern 
steadfastly maintained that he was not responsible for the murder or 
robbery ot Mr. hamby on January 1. 1980. ihe defendant convincingly 
sfaTea tnat ne did not Kpnw Mf. fillips was gninp to rob thg victim 
nor snoot nun, he further claimed that he could not prevent Mr. Phillip 
from committing these offenses as Phillips turned the gun toward him 
warned him to allegedly ba^ fr r>ff^ After the commission of the orrense 
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OFFENSE: 
B. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT: (Continued) 
Mrf VnrrhPrn g^tpg that hP un< "in shock" and attempted rn rnnr.irt 
the police; however. Mr. Phillips kept him a "prisoner" in their 
apartment. Mr. Northern further maintains that he was attempting 
to contact the nolirp hut hpfore he could do so, was arrestea.m 
It is interesting to note t^ flf it wag npparpnt to fhis agent that 
Mr. Northern expressed no remorse for what ^annened tn thP vir^jm 
in this case. Thp only Pmotior, thp HpfpnHant ^ P P ^ I to nortrnv 
wac; that of outrage for a legal system which apparently he fPPI g 
had promised Kim a placement in the California Youth .Authority" 
with the actual result of his being nlrxreJ at the Utah SmtP Prison 
for a 90-Day Evaluation. Mr. Northern explained to this agent that 
he was testifying against Mr. Phillips and had, in fact, acted as 
a witness for the State at the preliminary hearing. 
C. INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER'S STATEMENT: 
Contact was made with Detective Carl Voyles of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. Detective Vovles maintained that it was Mr. Norther 
who, in fact, initiated the Robbery. "He pulled a gun first and both" 
he and Phillips were armed." The detective maintained that it was 
Mr. Northern who initiated the situation, which ultimately r^nitpH -jn 
Mr. Hamby's death. When arrested, it became annarent to the rieterti^ 
that Mr. Northern was cunning and very intelligent compared_to 
Mr. Phillips who was rather slow^ "i reel that islorthern dominated 
Phillips. Also, Mrs. Hamby is a widow now with seven children." 
The detective pointed out that it was Mr. Northern who purchased 
the murder weanon with a forged check anH also nnrrhnspd a T ^ 
pistol which was on his person at fh* time he was arrested. That 
particular gun was purchased at Guns Unlimited, Salt Lake City. 
"He is a macho kid who is most unpredictable. As a matter of fact. 
he^was reanv to leave the area and we arrested him just before he 
got away." 
D. VICTIM'S STATEMENT: 
Contact was made with Mrs. Everett Hamby, Jr., widow of the deceased. 
Mrs. Hamby indicated that she has no vengeful feelings against the 
defendants but feels that a prison commitment is appropriate, 
mostly, because Mrs. Hamby indicated that both individuals could do 
further harm in the community if they were released. Presently she 
is the sole support of her seven children, however, is receiving 
some money from social security and workmen's compensation. To 
supplement that income, however, Mrs. Hamby must take in other 
children for day care. 
Mrs. Hamby stated that Mr. Phillips has written her a letter 
indicating that he is sorry for what has happened. She thought that 
was significant, but chose not to reply to Mr. Phillips1 letter, as 
Mrs. Hamby described receiving that letter was "rubbing salt in the 
wounds." 
PRIOR RECORD: 
A. JUVENILE: The following information was secured- from the records 
of the Second District Juvenile Court and the records of Maricopa 
County, Arizona. 
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PRIOR RECORD: 
A. JUVENILE: 
DATE 
5/3/"8 
6/19/78 
3/19/79 
8/31/79 
8/29/79 
9/12/79 
8/7/79 
(Continued) 
CHARGE 
Theft of a Vehicle 
Petty Theft 
Probfttjon ViqJ^jon 
Jobation Violation 
Theft of a Vehicle 
BuEgLaLQr 
Receiving -Stnlpn Property 
DISPOSITION 
Probation 
Nonjudicial handlinp 
Nonjudicial handling 
Nonjudicial handling 
Pending "7 
^ t^9 
Pending S &>*t%X 
Pending ) 
.According to the records of the Second District Juvenile Court, 
Mr. Northern was first arrested in May of 1978 for Theft of a 
Vehicle. That involved a neighbor's dunebuggy. A Bench Warrant 
was subsequently issued because the defendant failed to report 
regularly to his probation officer and, in fact, violated the terms 
of his probation by getting arrested on June 19, 1978 for Petty 
Theft, when he attempted to switch price tags in a store. Further, 
on August 31, 1979, tha-defendant left the State of Arizona without 
permission. On August 29, 1979 the defendant was charged with Theft 
of a Vehicle wherein he took his parents' van and was subsequently 
arrested in Houston, Texas. The defendant was also charged with 
Burglary on 9/12/79 when he burglarized his parents1 home. Also in 
August Of 1979 t h e fofpn^anl- wag ZTT**tf>A f n r rprphnnp <;tn1 Pn prnpPr tV 
and that matter is pending. According to the defendant's Juvenile 
Court probation officer in Arizona, probation was unsuccessful as the 
defendant was resistant to counseling and to change. 
B. ADULT: 
The following information was secured from the records of the Utah 
Bureau of Criminal Identification: 
AGENCY DATE CHARGE 
S.O. SLCo. 1/10/80 Murder and Robbery 
18 counts Forgery, Fel. Ill 
DISPOSITION 
Present offense; 90 U 
Diag. Eval. ordered 
4/24/80 
Prosecution declined 
as result or mea 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
Kendall Quinn Northern was born May 5, 1962, the youngest of four children 
born to Don and Clair Northern. The defendant's parents were both from 
Southern Utah and married in 1950. The defendant was born in Kaysville, 
Utah where his father was a high school teacher. When Kendall was approximr 
four, the familyTelocatea tfl S6Utn5|ra L511fo"rnia where Mr. Northern took a_ 
with Litton Corporation. In 1972, when Kendall was teny the defendant's paj 
became selt-enfomy^tt and moved to Arizona. The family is LPS (Mormon) and~ 
according to some reports, is a very cohesive family. However, Kendall be^; 
haying personal problems at an ear^y ape and hpcamp a behavioral problem in 
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BACKGROUND IM-PRMATION: (Continued) 
grade school. HA ^j^pheved his parents and described hinself as heme a 
"pansy" by being pushed around" by other children. 
The defendant began acting-out shortly after the family moved to Phoenix, 
Arizona and there appeared to be some family instability according to the 
records of the Second District Juvenile Court in Salt Lake City. Accord-
ing to the records o^ the Maricopa County Probation Department for Juvenile 
Offenders, the defendant's family had a difficult tim* in 1Q7Q with k w r n j 
In February oi 1979, Mrs. Northern contacted the probation officer because 
she feared Kendall would hpmmp violent. He was counseled and apparently 
there was a iHfferenre of nnim'nn as tn where Kenria 1 I snouid wort! It 
was tne probation officer's opinion that both the parents and Kendall were 
placing him in the middle. In July of 1979, according to the parents, 
Kendall left the state and bounced several checks on his employer as well 
as stealing some tools and cash. The probation officer made a comment. " 
"I feel that Kendall and his parents have no regard for the Court or proba-
tion." 
For a period of approximately four years, Kendall Northern was treated by 
Doctor Scoresby, a counseling psychologist. Doctor Scoresby classified^ 
the defendant as a "con artist." 
At an e a r l y a g e , thft ripfppfrnt h^ramo nnrtepfrnHfrnt anH 1 » f t hnmp flf apA 
16 and joined a local magazine crew. The defendant traveled a great deal 
between (Jaliiornia, Arizona, and Florida. 
The defendant drooped out of the tenth grade at Corona del Sol School in 
Tempe, Arizona. He had been involved in sports but failed to follow 
through. The defendant was then placed in the parochial school by his 
parents as they felt he needed the controls. However, the defendant 
shortly thereafter became involved in further problems with the Juvenile 
Court and quit school again. According to a Juvenile Court report, the 
parents "expressed their concern that Kendall's mature sir*, "^jfll ha-knc 
no control over, and his exceptional social skill, which thev roinfnrrpd 
as a family standard, Would be used Unjil5tly against their son." The 
defendant was xaoeiea eariy as oem£ BOTn 6bnoxious and a troublemaker 
in school. According to one report from the Detention Ce^er at the Second 
District Juvenile Court in Salt Lake City, the defendant lost his temper to 
the point that they thought he would become assaultive. The defendant has 
a tendency to exaggerate and in the past, the defendant's father has attenpt 
to intercede in the Court process and both parents tend to minimize the 
defendant's problems. 
XIADTTA 
The de iimU4. 
»-»k« n attended elementary schools both in Southern Laiih> 
of Arizona. He was last enrolled in a parochial '.r 
Topping out of Corona del Sol High School while in the 
t Records of the Second District Juvenile Court indicate that 
t.., ,. ..._., „as a behavioral problem while in school. He did get 
involved in %puits while in high school, however, did not follow through 
wnli ilie iq»niK\ According to the attached Psychological Evaluation, the 
defHiciam 1% intellectually in the Superior range. Since housed at the 
Iff.ih Shite Prison, the defendant has expressed what appears to be a smcer 
decile tn rerrive his GED and ultimately to take college courses. 
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HEALTH: 
A
* PHYSICAL: The defendant is in good physical health and underwent 
a complete medical examination at the Utah State Prison. Having 
suffered from the usual childhood diseases, the defendant has no 
significant impairments. 
B. RENTAL .AND EMOTIONAL: (Please refer to the attached Psychological 
Evaluation completed by the Division of Corrections as well as the 
Psychological Evaluation and Psychiatric Evaluation completed by 
the Second District Juvenile Court.) 
ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE: 
A. ALCOHOL: The defendant acknowledges he is a socia] flr-inV^ r* however, 
he has no prior arpf^t^ fp-r ai^h^i-y^ai-ed^offenses. Alcohol did 
notapparently play a part in the present offense. 
B. DRUGS: Again, the defendant has fiad nn Hmcr-rplaffirl arrets anH 
TTTIoes not appear rfra^ . hp ha,< a cipnifiranf problem in this area 
eitfier. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
Mr. Northern's employment record is sporadic. At the time of his arrest 
for the present offense he was working atTJte Cab Company and previous 
to that had WoT^ed at LIMLU in salt Lafre Litv for approximately one and 
ajialf niOfltM. Prior to that, he worked tor various moving ar^^Qrapf 
caHiPMlSSj. "As is indicated in the file material of the Second District 
Juvenile Court, the defendant did work for a period of time for his parents 
as a salesman. 
MILITARY: The defendant lias never been in.the military. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: 
A collateral contact was made with Mr. Don Northern and Mrs. Clair Northern, 
the defendant's parents, at 11813 South Maze Court. Phoenix, Arizona, Both 
Mr. and Mrs. Northern met with this agent in Salt Lake City. They indicated 
that they are very concerned over their son's current situation and feel 
that he was threatened by the co-defendant to get involved in the present 
offense. Mr. Northern indicated that he has had some problems with his son 
in the past but they have not been of a serious nature. Specifically, 
Mr. Northern told this agent about the defendant's arrest for stealing a 
neighbor's dunebuggy and a subsequent arrest in Houston, Texas when the 
defendant had the family van. Mr. Northern indicated that at that time he 
decided to leave Kendall in jail to deal with the situation on his own. 
Mrs. Northern indicated that Kendall has always been a very large person an 
has been ridiculed by his peers. Mrs. Northern further stated that her son 
is a "good boy" and has been dealt with unfairly in his present Court matte 
Mrs. Northern indicated that she feels her son should be placed in a progrr 
for youthful offenders so he could hopefully pursue his education, 
Mr, and Mrs. Northern were upset to learn that their son had pleaded guilt] 
to two First Degree Felonies. It was their impression that there was only 
one charge involved. 
A collateral contact was made by letter with Jean Cotter, the defendant's 
sister residing in tempe, Arizona. The letter indicates that the defendan 
had pretty much a normal upbringing and was a very bright individual. 
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (Continued) 
The defendant was also characterized as being very enterprising. It was 
his sister's belief that "Kenny just happened to be with the wrong person 
at the wrong time. You see, Kenny has always been big for his age and 
extremely overweight and so he has been constantly ridiculed and teased 
by other kids his age his whole life. Kenny felt he had no other choice 
but to be friends with the only kids that would accept him and unfortunately 
Bob was one of those friends," There was an indication in the letter that 
the defendant was not accepted completely by the family. "No one ever in 
Kenny's life has treated him with worth except on occasi on his family, and 
I'm sad to say that that wasn't very often." 
A collateral contact was made with Karen Fleming, the defendant's sister 
who resides in Mesa, Arizona. According to Mrs. Fleming, the defendant 
and his brother and sisters were raised by a very fine mother and father. 
The defendant and his family were very active in sports and picnicking 
and the defendant's sister indicated that because of his size, he has always 
had problems, Mrs. Fleming feels that her brother has attempted to get 
attention from the family and others by sometimes outrageous behavior. "lie 
is full of love and has a heart big enough for three people and most 
important, does not belong in a prison. He is a kind person and I've heard 
it said that in prison they take kindness for weakness." 
A collateral contact was made with Amy Black, the defendant's grandmother 
in Mesa, Arizona. Mrs. Black indicated that the detendant has always been 
a kind-hearted boy. "Ken comes from such a fine home with parents that 
have such love and concern for their children and have tried very hard to 
instill a love for God in each of them." Mrs. Black indicated that they are 
hopeful that the defendant will receive some help rather than being com-
mitted to prison. 
RESPONSE TO 90-HAY EVALUATION: 
The defendant arrived in the custody of the Division of Corrections shortly 
after appearing in Court on April 24, 1980 and being ordered to undergo a 
90-Day Diagnostic Evaluation at the Utah State Prison. At his own request, 
the defendant was placed in protective custody as he was pending testifying 
in court against the co-defendant. As the Court is aware, the defendant 
was cooperative at the preliminary hearing stage in reference to giving 
evidence against the co-defendant. This agent has met with the defendant 
on numerous occasions in protective custody at the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Northern has indicated to this agent that he did not know this 
particular offense was going to occur and did not shoot Mr. Hamby. The 
defendant maintained that he was basically held prisoner by the co-defendan 
until the time of his arrest, Mr. Northern maintained that he was goinrj to 
contact the police. 
- i the fact that the defendant has been housed in protective custody, 
5 been involved in no negative activity. He remains in his cell 
almost 22 hours a day. The defendant has made inquiries as to whether he 
could work on his GED and seems very anxious to further his education. 
Mr. Northern has been cooperative with this agent and counselors at the 
institution and appears to be outgoing and congenial. However, much of 
the information the defendant supplied this agent contradicts previous 
information given the law enforcement agencies. 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION; 
Kendall Quinn Northern is an 18 year old Caucasian male who lias ; 
guilty to two First Degree Felonies. As the Court is aware, numei 
Forgery counts will not be brought against the defendant as part of a 
plea arrangement. At the time of his arrest for the present offense 
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SUTffiARY AM) EVALUATION: (t uiit iimni) 
the defendant was wanted by Juvenile authonties in the state of \rizona 
in reference to three separate charges. It appears that earlv m 19") 
the defendant went on a crime spree which involved various offenses in 
several different states. When the defendant cane to Utah he had recentlv 
been released from jail in Houston, Texas after taking a family van to 
that jurisdiction and getting arrested in reference to a traffic charge. 
Utilizing an identification which he had either found or stolen, the defend-
ant established a checking account in Salt Lake City under an assumed nare. 
He wrote numerous checks including a check for the murder weapon in reference 
to the pending charge. 
Mr. Northern assumed employment at LiIMCO in September of 1979 and advised 
his employer that he was going to leave town. Instead, the defendant 
assumed employment at a local cab company where the victim in this case was 
also employed. The defendant maintains that he was going to contact the 
police after the commission of the present offense but according to 
Detective Voyles they were able to arrest the defendant as he was preparing 
to leave town. 
According to the various psychological and psychiatric material in possession 
of the Division of Corrections, it appears that the defendant is basically 
untreatable. According to Dr. LeBeque, however, there is some recent informa-
tion indicating individuals such as the defendant might be treated over a 
long term period with sone success. Generally Northern appears to be motivated 
towards pursuing his education but he is basically an immature, confused voting 
man who is certainly a threat to the community 
SENTENCING OPTIONS: 
OPTION I That the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison in 
refeience to the charge of Aggravated Robbery and that it be 
served on a consecutive basis with the sentence imposed in 
ret'eieih-- •• the Criminal Homicide charge. 
OPTION TI Hint rhr defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison on J 
rnnnirrrnt basis in reference to both offenses. 
OFlIuu M I rii. i the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison and 
.ill.,,,,! he be sentenced fo the next lower offense, a Felony II. 
OPTION IV ITi.it the defendant be ordered to undergo a second 90-Day 
i Ination to determine if he is an appropriate candidate for 
ii Public Offender Program. 
Respectfully submitted. 
/eb 
Attach. 
Investigator 
APPROVED: 
' \ EUGENE PRKSEtT, Sup ervisoi 
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